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Abstract:
Under the traditional consideration doctrine, a promise is only legally enforceable if it is
made in exchange for something of value. This doctrine lies at the heart of contract law, yet it
lacks a sound theoretical justification – a fact that has confounded generations of scholars and
created a mess of case law.
This paper argues that the failure of traditional justifications for the doctrine comes from
two mistaken assumptions. First, previous scholars have assumed that anyone can back a
promise with nominal consideration if they wish to do so. We show how social norms against
commodification limit the availability of the consideration form. Some promises are made in
social contexts in which invoking consideration—that is, exchanging a promise in return for
something of value—violates social taboos. Specifically, we show that anti-commodification
taboos operate where the social message sent by a transaction is more important than the desire
to transfer goods or services. Whereas previous scholarship has assumed one can always invoke
consideration, we argue that anti-commodification norms make even nominal consideration
unavailable within these contexts.
Second, scholars have assumed that when parties utilize a formalism—such as nominal
consideration—to make their promises legally binding, they necessarily desire to be bound.
Using a game-theoretic model based on asymmetric information, we dispute the conventional
wisdom that the law should honor parties’ intentions as articulated at the time of contract
formation. We show how parties’ expressed intentions may not conform to their underlying
desires. A promisor may render her promise legally enforceable—even though she does not
want to—in order to signal her sincerity to the promisee. As a result, in a cycle of inefficient
signaling, other promisors may feel forced to do the same. Thus, the mere fact that parties take
advantage of a legally binding form does not imply that they desire the existence of that option.
Having the option to legally enforce a promise may harm both promisors and promisees.
Having exposed these two flawed assumptions, we provide a new framework for
determining which promises the law should enforce. Ultimately, what matters is not whether the
parties actually do invoke consideration, but rather whether they can invoke consideration.
Norms prevent parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent by a promise
is more important than the substance of the transaction—and these are precisely the types of
promises in which inefficient signaling is likely to occur. In other words, norms block the use of
consideration precisely where the option for legal enforcement of promises is most likely to harm
both promisors and promisees. Therefore, only when social norms allow the use of consideration
should we conclude that parties truly desire the option to have their promises legally enforced.
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COMMODIFICATIONAND CONTRACT FORMATION
INTRODUCTION

People make promises all the time. In the course of a day, we might promise a spouse to
complete household chores, a coworker to finish a project by its deadline, and a service provider
to pay for a service upon completion. Yet only the last of these promises will generally impose a
legal obligation. Whereas the first two statements are mere unilateral promises, the fact that the
third promise is exchanged for something of value—the service—makes it a contract that can be
enforced in courts of law.
This rule is known as the consideration doctrine: The law will not enforce unilateral
promises, but promises exchanged for something of value become legally binding contracts.
There are many exceptions to this doctrine. Other rules besides consideration can make a
promise legally binding, and not all promises backed by consideration are legally enforceable.
Nevertheless, the consideration doctrine remains the most important rule for distinguishing
between unenforceable promises and contracts backed by law.
Unfortunately, we lack a sound theoretical justification for the consideration doctrine.1
Underlying most of contract law is the general principle that parties’ intentions should be
honored.2 So why, then, do we refuse enforcement to even those unilateral promises which were
clearly intended to be binding?
Existing attempts to justify the consideration doctrine fall into two general camps. First,
formalist scholars defend the doctrine as a mechanism for determining parties’ intentions. By
creating a hoop the parties must jump through in order to make their promises binding, the law
creates a mechanism for parties to convey which promises they intend to impose legal
obligations. In order to make their promises legally enforceable, the parties need only claim that
their promise is being exchanged for something of value. In other words, they need only recite
consideration. Yet as Eric Posner explains, “there is no reason to require parties to recite a
consideration as opposed to reciting that they want their [promise] to be enforced. . . . Efforts to
rationalize this practice as a way of ensuring that courts can distinguish enforceable and
unenforceable promises fail because they do not explain the ‘form’ of the formality.”3 No one
doubts that formal mechanisms have their place within the legal system. But formal accounts of
the consideration doctrine have failed to justify the use of consideration specifically. If the
ultimate goal is to determine which promises the parties intended to be binding, why not simply
require parties who desire enforcement to declare so in writing?4
In contrast to formalist scholars, who view the consideration doctrine as a tool for
determining when parties want their promises to be enforced, substantive theorists see the
doctrine as a means for separating unilateral promises from exchanges. Substantive accounts
argue that unilateral—or “gratuitous”—promises are less socially valuable than promises made
as part of a bilateral exchange. The substantive approach cares not for the parties’ intentions or
what steps they take to communicate a desire to be bound; only “true” exchange promises are
deemed worthy of legal enforcement.
1

See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1477-81 (2004).
In the words of Charles Fried, contract law rests on “the liberal principle that the free arrangements of rational
persons should be respected.” CONTRACT AS PROMISE 35 (1981).
3
Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829,
850 (2003).
4
See infra Part I.A for more on this point.
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At first glance, substantive arguments might seem to offer a valid justification for the
consideration doctrine. Yet, as we shall see, these arguments fail to withstand sustained
reflection.5 Like most other scholars who have reviewed the literature, we conclude that
gratuitous promises are not inherently less deserving of legal support.
While academics have debated about these flawed accounts of the consideration doctrine,
courts have floundered over the doctrine’s weak theoretical foundations. Some courts have
followed the formalist approach, enforcing promises backed by even trivial amounts of
consideration, while other courts have invoked substantive principles in striking down promises
where the consideration is insignificant in value.6 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts rejects
the use of nominal consideration – consideration of minimal worth – where the Restatement
(First) had accepted it, but neither version has proved authoritative for how courts actually
decide these disputes. As current doctrine stands, there is no predictable answer to the question
of how much consideration is needed before a promise will be enforced.
This paper argues that the problematic state of the consideration doctrine flows from two
assumptions shared by nearly all commentators. First, scholars have assumed that any parties
who desire to do so can back a promise with nominal consideration. And second, scholars have
assumed that only parties who truly want their promises to be legally enforced will utilize a
formalism—like nominal consideration—to make their promises binding. As we will
demonstrate, both of these assumptions are flawed.
The first assumption claims that all parties who wish to do so can back their promises
with nominal consideration. After all, what could possibly prevent parties from exchanging a
promise for a penny in order to make it binding? Our answer is anti-commodification norms.
By its very nature, the use of consideration commodifies a promise by insisting that the
promise be exchanged for something of value. Many promises are made within relationships in
which the parties are supposed to be guided by more than just self-interest and economic
rationality. Within these relationships, a promisor who asks for something in return for her
promise risks signaling that she views the relationship in instrumental terms. The consideration
doctrine can only be activated when parties agree that a promise is made as part of a bargainedfor exchange. But discussing promises using bargain-oriented language and behavior may be
inappropriate within certain social contexts. To even suggest the use of nominal consideration
might undermine the trust upon which these relationships are built.
We examine the literature on commodification within three branches of knowledge: (1)
sociology and anthropology, (2) philosophy and political theory, and (3) economics and game
theory. Although the literature does not enable us to determine precisely the circumstances
under which consideration will be socially unavailable, we can still reach some broad
conclusions about the nature of anti-commodification norms. These norms apply when the
message sent by a promise is more important than the substance of the promise—that is, where
the actual transfer of the promised goods or services plays only a secondary role.
For example, when promising to take a loved one out for her birthday, the substance of
the promise may be less important than the message of affection it conveys. To commodify this
sort of promise—say, by asking the loved one to pay a dollar to ensure that the promise is
honored—would violate anti-commodification norms. Yet for other promises, the message sent
5

See infra Part I.B.
. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, No. CA03-692, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 341, at *10 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004); Noel v. Noel
512 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1973).
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is not as important as the substance of the pledge. A businesswoman who promises to distribute
goods on time will not violate norms by asking for payment in return for a guarantee of timely
delivery.
Scholars have recognized the importance of anti-commodification norms for many
aspects of the legal system—particularly within property law. Yet contracts scholars have not
heretofore discussed the implications of these norms for the consideration doctrine. Although we
have only a tentative understanding of how these norms work in practice, one conclusion is clear:
There exist circumstances in which anti-commodification norms block the use of consideration.
The assumption that all parties who so wish can readily make use of nominal consideration is
simply wrong.
We thus have a partial answer to the formalist’s dilemma. Due to anti-commodification
norms, a formal rule based on nominal consideration differs from other formal alternatives—
such as a seal or writing requirement. But does this difference favor the use of nominal
consideration? After all, the principle of honoring parties’ intentions would seem to justify using
the least-restrictive legal rule. To answer this question, we turn to the second flawed assumption
made by previous commentators: the assumption that parties’ expressed wishes necessarily
reflect their underlying desires.
To follow the principle that contract law should honor parties’ intentions, courts need to
determine the content of the parties’ intentions. In the absence of contravening circumstances
like duress, courts typically assume that parties who invoke a legal rule for making their
promises binding actually want their promises to be legally enforced. As adherents of the
traditional accounts might ask: Why would anyone take steps to bind themselves unless they
actually wanted to be bound? Yet as we demonstrate, this logic relies on a shallow
understanding of the nature of parties’ desires.
Employing a game-theoretic model based on asymmetric information, we show how
parties can essentially be forced into a legally binding form once that form is made available to
them. Even parties who would prefer not being able to make their promises legally enforceable
may find it necessary to utilize a doctrine like nominal consideration once it is put into place.
Crucially, there is a difference between one’s choice when confronted with a legal rule and one’s
preference for what the legal rule should be.
Consider the practice of promising. When a promisor makes her promise legally binding,
she exposes herself to legal sanction if she doesn’t follow through. Through this willingness to
face sanctions, promisors can signal commitment, assuring promisees of their sincerity. But
when only some promisors secure their promises through the law, promisees may become
suspicious of the promisors who fail to do so—suspicious, that is, of promisors who choose not
to make their promises legally enforceable. So as not to be seen as unreliable, promisors may be
forced to render their promises legally binding, even if they would have preferred to avoid the
potential legal entanglement.
Thus, promisors’ expressed intentions do not necessarily match their underlying desires.
Under a regime in which promisors can render their promises legally enforceable, they may
choose to do so. However, the promisors might well wish they lived in a regime without this
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option. In other words, the mere fact that parties choose to employ a legally binding form does
not necessarily indicate that they desire the option to use that form.7
Having discarded the two flawed assumptions underlying traditional accounts of the
consideration doctrine, we can outline our novel justification for the doctrine. Rejecting the first
assumption tells us that a rule based on nominal consideration differs from other formal
alternatives. Due to anti-commodification norms, not all parties can utilize nominal
consideration. Rejecting the second assumption tells us that parties who take advantage of a
legal rule might not desire its existence. Utilizing a permissive approach—such as enforcing all
promises where the parties express a desire for enforcement in writing—could end up harming
both promisors and promisees.
To synthesize these two observations into our novel account of the consideration doctrine
we need one final insight: Anti-commodification norms deny the option of legal enforcement to
precisely those parties who should prefer not to have the option made available. Social norms
prevent the parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent by a promise is
more important than the substance of the transaction—and these are precisely the types of
promises in which inefficient signaling is likely to occur. Conversely, where the substance of the
transaction is more important than the message sent, inefficient signaling is unlikely to take
place. Thus, where anti-commodification norms allow parties to invoke consideration, the
parties should generally benefit from having the option to make their promises legally binding.
And where anti-commodification norms prevent parties from using consideration, we can expect
that the parties prefer not having an option for legal enforcement.
Our novel account of the consideration doctrine is formalist in nature. Yet where
previous formalist arguments have been unable to justify the use of consideration over
alternative forms, we show that the consideration doctrine better tracks parties’ underlying
desires. If we allowed parties to bind themselves through an alternative form like a writing
requirement, some promisors might feel forced to make their promises legally enforceable even
when they would prefer not to be able to do so. The consideration doctrine avoids this result by
providing an option of legal enforceability that can only be exercised within social relationships
where parties are likely to desire the option.
The paper proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the inadequacies of existing theoretical
accounts of the consideration doctrine and of the manner in which the courts have applied the
doctrine. The Part is primarily intended to provide background information; readers who are
already familiar with the problematic state of the consideration doctrine may wish to skip
directly to Parts II, III, and IV, where we develop our novel solution to the doctrine’s problems.8
In Part II, we survey the literature on anti-commodification to show how social taboos
prevent some parties from backing their promises with even nominal consideration. Part II
depicts the first flawed assumption made by traditional accounts of the consideration doctrine.

7

The availability of a legally binding form can harm promisees as well as promisors. There are costs to securing a
promise through the legal system. Forcing promisors to bear these costs may lead them to reduce the magnitude of
their promises, thereby reducing the value received by promisees. See Part III.C infra.
8
This is not to suggest that Part I adds nothing to the literature. We believe our description of the inadequacies of
existing theory and doctrine forms a better overview than other accounts. We also add several new critiques and
observations that have not yet appeared in the literature. Nevertheless, the primary value of our paper lies in Parts
II, III, and IV. We doubt that many scholars of the consideration doctrine will be surprised with the results of our
analysis in Part I.
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Even when courts enforce promises backed only by nominal consideration, some parties remain
unable to utilize the consideration form.
Part III explains the second flawed assumption of existing theories. The principle of
honoring parties’ intentions does not mean that we should always look to parties’ expressed
wishes with regard to an individual transaction. There is a difference between one’s actions
when confronted by a legal rule and one’s preference for what the legal rule should be. Granting
parties an option to bind themselves can ultimately harm both promisors and promisees.
Part IV synthesizes the results from the previous two parts to provide a novel justification
for the consideration doctrine. Expanding on our game-theoretic analysis, we argue that anticommodification norms only prevent the use of consideration in circumstances wherein parties
should generally prefer not to have a legally binding option made available. Where the option
for legal enforcement is beneficial, anti-commodification norms should not prevent parties from
invoking consideration. Hence, we would use the consideration doctrine as a means for
distinguishing, not between promises, but between the social contexts in which promises are
made.
To conclude, we demonstrate how our new justification for the consideration doctrine can
help resolve the morass of existing case law. Our account calls for strict application of the
principle of nominal consideration. All promises backed by even trivial amounts of
consideration should be enforced, but promises should generally not be legally obligating
without at least a token amount of consideration. This rule obviates the need for the many
exceptions and qualifications plaguing current applications of the doctrine.
I. THE INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Despite vigorous debates about the underlying rationale for contract law, most
commentators accept the goal of honoring parties’ intentions as expressed at the time of contract
formation. One school of thought maintains that promisors should be free to commit themselves
to a future course of action, and that enforcing a promise both increases the promisor’s liberty
and demonstrates respect for her autonomy.9 A second school of thought focuses on the
promisee’s reasonable expectations, which will be disappointed if the promisor breaches.10
Under this approach, the enforcement of promises primarily serves to avoid the harms of dashed
expectations. A third school of thought emphasizes the social utility of promises, which allow
promisees to reorder their affairs in anticipation of performance.11 Here, legal enforcement of
promises is required to ensure that promisees can rely without fear of breach. Thus, though each
of the major schools of contract theory begins with a different premise, all three conclude that
the law should follow a promisor’s stated intentions at the time of promising.
Against this backdrop of respecting parties’ wishes, the consideration doctrine requires
affirmative justification. By rendering promises unenforceable when not accompanied by
appropriate recompense, the consideration doctrine departs from the principle of honoring
parties’ expressed intentions. The doctrine allows even the most sincere of promisors to later
renege with impunity when the promise was not made as part of an exchange. No matter how
9

See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 2; Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1986).
See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990).
11
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541
(2003).
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unequivocally the promisor states his intention to perform—though he may “shout consideration
to the housetops”12—the promise is a legal nullity if consideration is lacking.
As discussed previously, attempts to justify the non-enforceability of promises that lack
consideration divide into two general categories—formal arguments and substantive arguments.
Yet existing arguments of both types have failed to provide a convincing rationale for the
consideration doctrine. Based on these flawed theoretical principles, courts have created a mess
of their attempts to apply the doctrine to actual cases.
A. Formal Arguments
Formal arguments emphasize not the significance of a promise, but the form that it takes.
The legal system must have some mechanism for distinguishing between unenforceable promises
and binding contracts. Formal arguments discuss rationales related to the needs of the legal
system. Without a clear set of rules for limiting the promises enforceable in law, we would risk
having our everyday utterances transformed into binding contracts even when we have no
intention of invoking a legal form. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine our capitalist system
functioning without some method for securing at least those contracts used to facilitate market
transactions. No one supports enforcing all promises or none at all. Formal arguments seek to
help courts with the difficulties involved in drawing a line between these two extremes.
Formal arguments thus stress the importance of a promise’s outward appearance.
Promises that take a particular form are more worthy of legal enforcement, not because they are
substantively superior, but because the form says something about the process by which the
promise came about. Because formal arguments focus on superficial indicia, rather than on
content, they often point in opposite directions from substantive arguments. For instance,
formalist theories usually support enforcing promises backed by only nominal consideration,
whereas substantive accounts frequently do not.
At first glance, a formal approach to justifying the consideration doctrine might appear to
serve contract law’s aim of respecting parties’ intentions. By outlining the conditions under
which promises will be enforced, the consideration doctrine provides parties with a blueprint for
giving legal force to their intentions. Yet the consideration doctrine is a poor means of
effectuating parties’ wishes, because it denies enforcement to many promises where there is no
question that the promisor intended to be bound. An alternative more consistent with the
underlying goal of respecting parties’ desires would be to require only that the parties clearly
declare their intentions in writing.13 As the following discussion demonstrates, a writing
requirement would be preferable to the consideration doctrine in terms of the formal arguments
typically offered to support it.
1. The “Evidentiary” Rationale
Many formal theorists maintain that the consideration requirement is necessary to
preserve evidence of a transaction for later judicial inquiry. In the words of Richard Posner, the
consideration doctrine “reduces the number of phony contract suits, by requiring the plaintiff to
prove more than just that someone promised him something; he must show that there was a deal
12
13

In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
Arguably, such a requirement would more closely track the expectations of the non-lawyer public.
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of some sort—which is a little harder to make up out of whole cloth.”14 Because donative
promises are often oral, consideration is defended as a form of objective proof to corroborate a
promisee’s claim.15 Such proof allegedly serves to reduce the likelihood that a false claim will
prevail and lowers the cost of adjudicating all claims.16
However, to argue that legal enforcement of a promise should only occur where a
promisee can produce evidence substantiating his claim is not necessarily to argue in favor of a
consideration requirement. Many possible methods of maintaining evidence exist, most notably
a writing requirement. In fact, the consideration doctrine is a relatively poor way to preserve
proof, since a promisee’s delivery of a nominal sum to the promisor can be easily denied—
leaving the parties in precisely the same position as if no consideration for the promise existed.
And when the consideration for one promise is another promise, as is often the case, no evidence
of the transaction is preserved.17 As Andrew Kull notes, “it is difficult to think of any respect in
which [problems of proof] are necessarily exacerbated if the promise is gratuitous rather than
compensated.”18 While the need to preserve evidence may justify some sort of ritual to
solemnize a transfer, the consideration doctrine is a lousy candidate.19
2. The “Cautionary” Rationale
Another formal argument claims that the consideration doctrine ensures that a promisor
intends to be legally bound and that she does so only after sufficient deliberation.20 By requiring
an extra step—the transfer of consideration—before rendering a promise enforceable, the
doctrine prevents promisors from hastily committing themselves to obligations they might later
regret. The ritual of consideration also ensures that the promisor intends to be bound legally.
Even a promisor who fully intends to perform at the time the pledge is made may wish not to
render his promise legally enforceable. By failing to receive consideration in return for the
promise, the promisor can ensure that the legal system will not become involved in the event of
breach.
As to the former justification, the prevention of hasty promises, one might wonder
whether the consideration doctrine is overkill. As Kull notes, “[s]uch cases are easy to imagine
but hard to find in the reports.”21 In any event, there is little reason to believe that rash donative

14

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 109 (5th ed. 1998).
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979-1980).
16
The consideration doctrine’s evidentiary function has been claimed to justify the minority rule that past moral
obligation may serve as a substitute for consideration. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics
and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 418-19 (1977). But cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
799, 821 (1941) (arguing that promises supported by moral obligation should be enforced despite the “evidentiary
insecurity” they generate).
17
See James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 991 (1990).
18
See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 39, 53 (1992).
19
Moreover, the statute of frauds already requires that substantial problems be recorded in writing, so that problems
of proof will only exist, if at all, for relatively minor donative promises. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 990-91.
20
This section discusses what Fuller called the “channeling” function of consideration in addition to what he labels
as the “cautionary” function.
21
Kull, supra note 18, at 46.
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promises are any more common than rash purchases.22 Yet the law does not control for
deliberation in bargain context, even though a poorly thought-out bargain might prove ruinous to
one or both parties, “because the law does not really care about deliberation.”23 However, even
if the deterrence of hasty donative promises is important, the consideration doctrine is hardly an
inevitable choice. Any formal enforceability requirement—that the promisor stand on his head
and count backwards from twelve, for instance—would serve the same purpose.24 And any
formality would similarly ensure that the promisor intended to be bound.
Neither evidentiary nor cautionary arguments can justify the consideration doctrine.
However worthwhile the desire to preserve evidence for future dispute resolutions or to
guarantee that donative promises are made carefully and with the intention to be bound, a
consideration requirement is no better than other formalities. Indeed, the transfer of a dollar is a
far shoddier means of preserving proof than a requirement that donative promises be made in
writing. Thus, formal arguments for the consideration doctrine cannot “explain the ‘form’ of the
formality.”25 Although we clearly need some mechanism for distinguishing binding contracts
from empty statements, existing formal accounts do not show why the consideration doctrine
best serves this role. To the extent we believe in the principle of honoring parties’ intentions, we
should instead enforce all promises where the promisor clearly declares that she wishes to be
bound.
B. Substantive Arguments
Where formal arguments look to the needs of the legal system, substantive arguments
examine the content of promises. Some substantive theorists claim that the consideration
doctrine serves to distinguish between socially valuable exchanges and socially worthless gifts,
enforcing the former but not the latter. Others maintain that donative promises should not be
enforced because the costs of enforcement outweigh the benefits. Substantive accounts do not
deny that as a general rule we should enforce promises when the parties desire it. Instead,
substantive accounts try to show how this wisdom does not apply to a subset of promises that do
not merit enforcement. Substantive arguments thus run directly counter to the idea that contract
law should respect parties’ intentions in all cases. No matter how strongly the parties wish to be
bound, no matter what hoops they are willing to jump through to render their intentions
enforceable, a substantive approach would deny enforcement to promises not made as part of an
exchange. Yet existing substantive arguments for the consideration doctrine ultimately prove
unpersuasive.
1. The “Sterile” Rationale
A common defense of the consideration doctrine argues that promises lacking in
consideration are less socially useful than promises exchanged for something of value. Whereas
22

It is, perhaps, not coincidental that the term “buyer’s remorse” exists but that “donor’s remorse” does not—though
one might argue, however implausibly, that the existence of the consideration doctrine is responsible for suppressing
the supply of remorseful donors.
23
Kull, supra note 18, at 54.
24
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 991.
25
Posner, supra note 3, at 850.
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exchanges enhance overall social wealth, donative transfers merely redistribute it.
Characterizations of donative promises as economically “sterile” have a long pedigree. Quoting
the 1884 lectures of Claude Bufnoir in his famous article, Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller
opined that “While an exchange of goods is a transaction which conduces to the production of
wealth and the division of labor, a gift is, in Bufnoir’s words, a “sterile transmission.’”26 And
this description persists in the literature today.27
Yet despite the influence of the notion that donative promises are economically sterile, its
validity is highly questionable. As a preliminary matter, donative transfers may themselves be
welfare-enhancing: If the donee values a gift more than the donor, then the transfer enhances
social utility. As Melvin Eisenberg explains, “gifts have a wealth-redistribution effect, and taken
as a class probably redistribute wealth to persons who have more utility for money than the
donors.”28
Some economists have claimed that gift giving is inefficient, because—barring wealth
effects—if a donee had valued the gift at more than its cost, then the donee would have already
purchased it for himself. That the donee did not purchase the item for himself suggests that he
values it at less than its price. But there are several reasons to doubt this claim. First, the value a
donee places on an item may increase by virtue of the fact that the item is given as a gift. Many
are those who would walk by a flower stand without buying anything but would be thrilled to
receive a dozen roses from a loved one. The giving of a gift suggests thoughtfulness and
affection on the part of the giver, and these sentimental effects may increase the gift’s value well
beyond its purchase price. Second, in some situations the donor may have better information
than the donee either about the donee’s preferences or, more likely, about the existence,
availability, or value of the gift. The donor may also have better access to the gift. For instance,
the donor may promise to return from a trip to the Andes with an Incan vase she knows her
friend would love. Third, many gifts cannot be purchased. A particular piece of artwork, for
instance, may only exist in the donor’s collection. If the donee values the piece more than the
donor, the donor will increase social welfare by giving it as a gift. Donative promises to perform
services often fall into this category. Fourth, the donor gets satisfaction from knowing that her
gift will be appreciated by the donee—in economic terms, the donor and donee have
“interdependent utility functions.”29 As Richard Posner has observed, “a promise would not be
made unless it conferred utility on the promisor.”30 Even if the donee values the gift below its
cost, the combination of the donor’s satisfaction and the gift’s value to the donee may exceed the
gift’s cost. Finally, gifts may be given as a means of facilitating future economic transactions,
26

Fuller, supra note 16, at 815 (quoting CLAUDE BUFNOIR, PROPRIÉTÉ ET CONTRAT 487 (2d ed. 1924)).
See Kull, supra note 18, at 49 (“Bufnoir’s lectures . . . continue to be cited by American writers for this . . .
assertion.”). However, even Fuller shied away from relying too heavily on this argument. See Fuller, supra note 16,
at 815 n.23 (“This remark of Bufnoir’s cannot be taken too literally . . . .”); see also Kull, supra note 18, at 49 n.33
(“None of these authors [citing the sterility of donative promises] argue that the gift promise is entirely ‘sterile.’ All,
in fact, suggest some respects in which a gift promise might be at least modestly fruitful.”).
28
Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 4.
29
See Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 713, 819-20 (1996); id. at 820 (“Interdependent utility is a perfectly familiar phenomenon and is quite
likely to be present in the context of true donative promises among family or friends . . . .”); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1272 (1980).
30
Posner, supra note 16, at 412; see also Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise
To Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, But Should Be, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1809, 1831-33
(2003).
27
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such as when businessmen exchange small tokens at the start of a business deal.31 Even if the
initial gift exchange does not increase social welfare, the ensuing economic transaction that it
facilitates very well might.
More fundamentally, however, even if donative transfers were socially sterile, donative
promises would still be socially valuable because they allow for beneficial reliance in advance of
performance. As Eric Posner explains, “A promise to give a gift enables the promisee to rely in
anticipation of receiving the benefit and enables the promisor to defer performance until the
funds or goods are acquired.”32 If a donee knows that a donor intends to give her a car at some
future date, she can avoid the costs of purchasing a car on her own in the interim. Beneficial
reliance of this sort is made possible by the enforcement of the promise, because the donee can
rest assured that her reliance will not be in vain. Even if donative gifts were sterile, the legal
enforcement of donative promises could still be welfare enhancing.33
2. The “Trivial” Rationale
A second substantive argument against enforcing donative promises is that such promises
are too trivial to merit legal recognition. Donative promises are sometimes casual and
insignificant—of the “I promise to take you out to dinner” variety.34 Allowing legal enforcement
of donative promises might involve the court system in “a lot of trivial promises arising in social
and family settings.”35 The exception to the consideration doctrine for charitable pledges has
been justified by contrasting the trivial nature of most donative promises with “the large size of
many charitable donations.”36 The consideration doctrine supposedly prevents the legal system
from having to assume the administratively costly job of policing interpersonal squabbles.37
However, even if it were true that many donative promises are too trivial to merit legal
enforcement, the consideration doctrine is a curious way to deal with the problem. A much more
direct approach would be to refuse to involve the legal system in disputes in which only a small
sum was at issue. Moreover, there is little reason to assume donative promises tend to be
relatively insignificant, or that the costs of litigating such promises would be particularly high.
Many donative promises tend to be quite substantial—for instance, “[a] parent’s promise to
finance a medical school education.”38 And even where small donative promises are concerned,

31

See Wessman, supra note 29, at 820; Carol Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts
Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (1992) (noting that the
practice of “giv[ing] a little for the sake of the larger bargain . . . happens all the time among business dealers” and
that “if someone does not give, the exchange may never get off the ground”); Gordon, supra note 17, at 995 (“Some
promises are related to exchanges, are ancillary to bargains, but are not themselves given in exchange for some
identifiable price. These promises have economic and social utility because they assist exchanges and promote
economic activity.”).
32
Posner, supra note 3, at 850; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1267-71 (1980); id. at 1269 (“[T]he
production of beneficial reliance is perhaps the principal social rationale of promising . . . .”).
33
See Posner, supra note 16, at 411-14.
34
See id. at 416-17.
35
POSNER, supra note 14.
36
See Posner, supra note 16, at 420.
37
See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 3; Posner, supra note 16, at 417.
38
See Wessman, supra note 29, at 826; see id. (“The claim that gratuitous or donative promises are financially
trivial is . . . empirically suspect.”).
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as Goetz and Scott point out, “it is no less expensive to litigate most small contracts.”39 As a
means of screening out trivial disputes, the consideration doctrine is both under-inclusive (since
many donative promises are large) and over-inclusive (since many contracts are small).
Additionally, promisees are unlikely to sue promisors for breach of trivial promises. As Andrew
Kull observes, litigation over a promise to take someone out to dinner “would be a freak
occurrence.”40 Finally, the legal system already denies enforcement to promises—whether
unilateral or bilateral—for which any injury is truly minimal.41 Thus, recourse to the
consideration doctrine to screen out trivial promises is not needed.
3. The “Unnecessary” Rationale
A third substantive argument maintains that enforcement of donative promises is
unnecessary because extra-legal sanctions will be sufficient to ensure performance. For altruistic
promisors who care about the well-being of their promisees, “the promisor may regard costs
suffered by the promisee as equivalent to costs suffered by himself,” thus obviating the need for
a legal sanction.42 Moreover, social norms against welshing may shame into performance even
those promisors unconcerned about their promisee’s interests. Therefore, some claim that legal
enforcement of donative promises is superfluous.
Yet arguments based on extra-legal sanctions hold no more validity than arguments
claiming that donative promises are trivial or sterile. First, even if extra-legal influences can
ensure performance in most instances, this does not explain why legal remedies should be
unavailable where such influences prove insufficient. Second, extra-legal sanctions may also be
more important than the law for most bargain exchanges.43 Sociological accounts have long
recognized that businessmen “seldom use legal sanctions . . . to settle disputes”44 because “there
are many effective non-legal sanctions,” such as norms of honesty, close ties between those in
the same industry, and anticipation of future interactions.45 Third, extra-legal sanctions may
prove ineffective to ensure performance when the promisor has passed away. The promisor’s
heirs or estate may be much less concerned with the promisee’s welfare, less influenced by
norms of promise-keeping (since it was not their promise in the first place), and less likely to
face social opprobrium from the relevant peer group. Indeed, suits against promisors’ estates
represent “[t]he overwhelming majority of suits to enforce [donative] promises.”46
In sum, substantive arguments for the consideration doctrine fall short because the
presence of consideration is a poor proxy for a promise’s value or society’s interest in enforcing
39

Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1301.
See Kull, supra note 18, at 56.
41
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 995 (“[T]he law already screens out claims involving trivial injuries by awarding
only certain kinds of damages. For example, suppose A and B mutually promise to meet each other for dinner. The
mutual promises are valid consideration . . . . However, the law declines to compensate with damages the slight
injury suffered, and so the case is not worth pursuing.”) (footnotes omitted); Kull, supra note 18, at 57.
42
Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1304.
43
See Gordon, supra note 17, at 994.
44
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963).
45
Id. at 63.
46
Kull, supra note 18, at 45-46; see id. at 46 (“The reason may be that unequivocal gift promises are highly likely to
be performed, provided the promisor lives long enough; or that the recipient of a gift promise, feeling toward his
benefactor something of the same altruism that motivates the promise, is likely to forgive a performance that the
promisor subsequently comes to regret.”).
40
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it. Donative promises are not necessarily any less socially beneficial or significant than bilateral
promises, nor is the legal enforcement of donative promises any less necessary.
Existing accounts, whether substantive or formal, fail to offer a convincing rationale for
not enforcing donative promises where the parties clearly intended the promise to be legally
binding. This lack of a coherent theoretical explanation for the consideration doctrine has
plagued its application in courts of law.
C. The Morass of Current Doctrine
As the previous sections demonstrate, the consideration doctrine lacks a compelling
justification under existing theories. Indeed, the two categories of justification for the doctrine
often conflict. While formal arguments suggest that any promise taking the requisite form
should be legally enforceable, substantive arguments invite courts to further inquire into
promises’ social usefulness. This ambivalence has manifested itself in the doctrine, with some
authorities favoring the former and others the latter. The result is a confused state of affairs in
which potential promisors face uncertainty about which donative promises will be enforced. As
one commentator noted: “The courts are not consistent in their application of the rule, partly
because they are unwilling to enforce it strictly in all cases, and partly because they are often
hazy in their understanding and knowledge of the topic. All this leads to present uncertainty and
doubt.”47
Consider first the notion that courts will strike down promises backed by only trivial
amounts of consideration. Authorities fall into opposing camps on the subject. According to
traditional doctrine, so long as both sides of a transaction receive something from the exchange,
the fact that one side receives something of much greater value is of no moment.48 Indeed, even
if what one party gives up is of nearly no value at all but is only given for the sake of serving as
consideration—so-called “nominal consideration”49 or “peppercorn consideration”—the
exchange remains legally enforceable. Thus, in 1932 the First Restatement of Contracts
maintained that a promise by one party to transfer land valued at $5000 to another party in
exchange for $1 is supported by “sufficient” consideration.50 This notion of consideration is
highly formal—in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, “as much a form as a seal.”51
Cases that follow the First Restatement prioritize the consideration doctrine’s formal
justifications over its substantivist ones.52 In Scholes v. Lehman,53 for instance, the court cited
47

Clarence D. Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration, 26 HARV. L. REV. 429, 429 (1913). Although written in
1913, these words remain the view of many scholars today. See, e.g., Wessman, supra note 29, at 809-812.
48
See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 114 Eng. Rep. 330 (Q.B. 1842) (finding that the exchange of a life estate in property
for a promise to pay £1 per year and keep the premises in good repair); see generally The Form of Bargain as
Consideration in Contracts, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 896, 900-901 (1924) (collecting cases).
49
See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (“By the word ‘nominal’ we mean ‘in name only’—the purported
consideration is given, but is not bargained for as part of an exchange. It is given as a mere pretense or formality.”).
50
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84, ill. 1.
51
Krell v. Codman, 28 N.E. 578, 578 (Mass. 1891); see also id. (“We presume that, in the absence of fraud,
oppression, or unconscionableness, the courts would not inquire into the amount of such consideration.”).
52
See, e.g., Smith v. Riley, No. E2001-00828-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002) (“[A] stipulation in consideration of $1 is just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger sum
stipulated for or paid.” (quoting Danheiser v. Germania Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 194 S.W. 1094, 1096 (Tenn.
1917))); Lacer v. Navajo County, 687 P.2d 404, 410 (Ariz. 1983); Hart v. Hart, 160 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa 1968)
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Fuller’s Consideration and Form for the proposition that the consideration doctrine serves
formal purposes: “a cautionary function of bringing home to the promisor the fact that his
promise is legally enforceable and an evidentiary function, important in a legal regime that
enforces oral contracts, of making it more likely that an enforceable promise was intended.”54
Notably, the court omits any reference to Fuller’s description of donative promises as
economically sterile—or to any other substantivist concerns. Instead, the court opines that a
court will not even consider consideration’s adequacy unless fraud or mistake is alleged.55
Rejecting this formal approach, the Second Restatement suggests that courts look past the
form of the transaction to make sure that gratuitous promises cannot be transformed into binding
contracts by adding minimal amounts of consideration. That the parties intend to be bound is not
enough. Transfer of “nominal” consideration in order to make a donative promise legally
binding will not be respected.56 Because nominal consideration is not bargained for, but is
instead merely a formality—that is, because the transaction is donative in substance, even though
it is an exchange in form—it is not sufficient to render an agreement legally enforceable.57 In
other words, courts should look through parties’ attempts to dress up a donative promise as an
exchange.58
Courts that follow the Second Restatement’s approach refuse to enforce promises they
suspect of being gifts.59 In O’Neil v. De Laney,60 the court observed that a gross disparity
between the value of a promise and the consideration offered in return for it signal that the
parties “did not actually agree upon an exchange.”61 The use of nominal consideration is a
“mere formality”62—a fact that, for the court, counsels against enforcement. Many courts pay lip
service to the notion that consideration’s adequacy is not to be scrutinized but then proceed to do

(“The general rule is that consideration is not insufficient merely because it is inadequate. The legal sufficiency of a
consideration for a promise does not depend upon the comparative economic value of the consideration and of what
is promised in return. Even a nominal consideration . . . will sustain a promise if it is the consideration in fact agreed
upon.” (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 102, at 445-46 (1964))).
53
56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995).
54
Id. at 756.
55
Id. (“One purpose the [consideration] requirement does not serve . . . is identifying fair exchanges. Unless fraud or
mistake is alleged, ordinarily a court will not even permit inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration for a
promise or a transfer.”).
56
RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 71(1)-(2).
57
See id. § 71, ill. 5 (“A desires to make a binding promise to give $ 1000 to his son B. Being advised that a
gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $ 1000 a book worth less than $ 1. B accepts the offer
knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no consideration for A’s promise to pay $
1000.”).
58
See also 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (agreeing with the Second Restatement); 1-3 Murray on Contracts §
61[A] (same).
59
See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, No. CA03-692, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 341, at *10 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]wo deeds
recited only nominal consideration, and it has been recognized that such a recitation does not destroy the
transaction’s character as a gift.”); Noel v. Noel 512 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1973) (observing that the recital of “‘Love and
affection and one dollar’” as consideration will not render a promise enforceable, as it “is characteristic of a gift”).
60
415 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
61
Id. at 1265 (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127, at 546 (1963)).
62
Id. (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127, at 546 (1963)). Interestingly, the quoted section of Corbin cites
Holmes’s opinion in Krell v. Codman for support. Yet Holmes never used the word “mere” to describe the effect of
nominal consideration, and it is far from clear that Holmes disapproved of its use. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
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just that, often by suggesting that a gross disparity in the value of promises exchanged indicates
fraud or unconscionability.63
Typical is Goodwin State Bank v. Mullins.64 The court starts with what seems like a
categorical prohibition: “While the court will inquire to determine whether a contract is
supported by consideration, it will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration.”65 In its
next breath, however, the court notes that an inquiry may be appropriate where “the amount is so
grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.”66 Significantly, the court makes no
mention of the parties’ intentions. That the promisor meant to be bound is immaterial; what
matters is whether the transaction is such as to merit enforcement.
Authorities are thus split between the First Restatement’s formal approach and the
Second Restatement’s substantive approach. Yet even authorities that generally insist that
consideration be non-trivial often make exceptions for certain classes of promises. For instance,
option contracts and guarantee contracts represent two notable exceptions to the rule that
consideration must be bargained for. What explains this striking departure? According to the
Second Restatement, the exceptions for option and guarantee contracts result from their social
utility.67 This social usefulness contrasts with the claimed sterility of ordinary donative
promises.68 Since option contracts and guarantee contracts are socially valuable in substance,
any imperfections in form can be ignored.69 Ironically, whereas these authorities normally
prioritize substance over form, they are willing to accept form over substance for promises that
they recognize as sufficiently valuable.
While many courts agree that some promises deserve special treatment and can be
exempted from the full consideration requirement, there is little agreement about exactly how
special this treatment should be. The majority position maintains that option and guarantee
contracts are enforceable with only nominal consideration but refuses to enforce promises where
consideration is promised but never delivered—so-called “sham” consideration.70 The minority
position would enforce such contracts even with sham consideration.71 The Second Restatement
endorses the minority approach, opining that option and guarantee contracts may be binding even

63

See, e.g., Rose v. Lurvey, 198 N.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mich. App. 1972) (relying on its power of equity to invalidate
the transfer of a parcel of land for $1.05); id. at 841 (“It is a general principle of contract law that courts will not
ordinarily look into the adequacy of the consideration in an agreed exchange. Equity will, however, grant relief
where the inadequacy of consideration is particularly glaring.”).
64
625 N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
65
Id. at 1079.
66
Id.
67
RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 88, cmt. a.; see also 1464 Eight,
Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (adopting the Second Restatement’s reasoning).
68
See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (arguing that the doctrine of nominal consideration need not be applied to
option and guarantee contracts because “[i]t is the area of the donative promise that justifies the invalidity of
nominal consideration”).
69
See also 1464 Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (agreeing with the Restatement that an
exception to the traditional consideration doctrine is warranted in the case of option contracts because of their social
utility).
70
See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834 (Idaho 1980); Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977).
71
See, e.g., 1464 Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2004); Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph, 153 A. 438 (Pa.
1930); RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS §§ 87-88; see also 1 Murray on Contracts § 61 (4th ed. 2001) (“[M]ost
courts hold that, upon proof that the recited amount has not been paid, the promise fails for want of consideration.”).
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if the purported consideration never changes hands.72 A third position would require no
consideration whatsoever; Corbin on Contracts argues that “[c]ommercial promises such as
options and credit guaranties should be enforceable without consideration.” 73
Each position thus takes a different stance on how much of a formality should be required
to render an option or guarantee contract enforceable—nominal consideration, sham
consideration, or no consideration. At base, this conflict represents a disagreement about the
persuasiveness of formal and substantive justifications for the consideration doctrine, and about
how to make tradeoffs between the two. Equitable concerns invariably put pressures on courts to
relax the strict substantive approach in appropriate cases. But because courts lack a single,
compelling justification for the consideration requirement, they inevitably disagree about when
(if ever) to make exceptions.
Consider other deviations from the bargained-for requirement. Some courts will enforce
many unilateral promises without even a pretense of consideration. Apparently the courts regard
these promises as even more substantively valuable than option and guarantee contracts. One
author found the following examples:
promises to waive nonmaterial conditions; promises to pay a prior indebtedness which was
unenforceable because of the statute of limitations, the promisor’s minority, or bankruptcy; certain
promises made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor; stipulations
regarding pending judicial proceedings; and firm offers by merchants, written waivers of claims,
and certain negotiable instruments under the UCC.74

And this list is not exclusive.75
Predictably, not all courts share the same view on the value of various promises. For
instance, charitable donations are enforceable without consideration in many jurisdictions,76
while in others they are not.77 Courts have carved out exceptions to exceptions, as doctrinal
consistency and coherence are abandoned in favor of preferred policy objectives.78 And further
compounding this uncertainty is the fact that courts sometimes misapply the doctrine.79
The current state of the consideration doctrine is thus deeply confused: Nominal
consideration will render a promise enforceable in some jurisdictions, but not in others. In
72

RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. c (“[T]he option agreement is not invalidated by proof that the recited
consideration was not in fact given.”); RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 88, cmt. b (precluding inquiry into whether
the purported consideration “was in fact given”).
73
See, e.g., 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17; see Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 110-11 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring)
(agreeing with Corbin on Contracts that an option contract should be enforceable without any consideration).
74
Gordon, supra note 17, at 1001-02.
75
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 90(2), cmt. f (observing that courts routinely enforce charitable
subscriptions and marriage settlements that are unsupported by consideration).
76
See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); see also RESTATEMENT (2D)
CONTRACTS § 90(2), cmt. f (“American courts have traditionally favored charitable subscriptions . . . , and have
found consideration in many cases where the element of exchange was doubtful or nonexistent.”)
77
See, e.g., Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989); Maryland Nat’l Bank v.
United Jewish Appeal Fed’n, Inc., 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979). Compare Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P.2d 388 (Mont.
1978) (refusing to allow a voidable or unenforceable promise to serve as consideration for a return promise), with
RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 78 (“The fact that a rule of law renders a promise voidable or unenforceable does
not prevent it from being consideration.”).
78
See Wessman, supra note 29, at 810-12.
79
See id. at 810 n.395 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions disallowing nominal consideration, formalities are not sufficient, except for certain
categories of promises where they are. And such jurisdictions disagree about which promises
merit an exception and what sort of formalities will suffice. Unless a new persuasive explanation
for it can be made, the consideration doctrine is destined to produce conflicting results in the
hands of courts that disagree with one another about the reasons for its existence.
II. THE ROLE OF ANTI-COMMODIFICATION NORMS
In order to explain our novel account for the consideration doctrine, we must first dispel
two flawed assumptions of the traditional approaches. The first flawed assumption is that any
promisor who wishes to do so can back her promise with nominal consideration. We need to
defeat this assumption in order to show how the consideration doctrine differs from other formal
requirements for distinguishing between binding and non-binding promises—such as a seal or
writing requirement. Their inability to appreciate how nominal consideration is a unique
formalism has prevented scholars from valuing it over alternative formalisms.
Our insight is that a nominal consideration requirement differs from alternative
formalisms because of anti-commodification norms. To invoke the consideration doctrine,
contracting parties must point to some form of recompense explicitly offered in return for a
promise. In other words, consideration requires the appearance of a bargain. Although it may be
trivial in size, the consideration must still be present; the parties must be able to claim that the
promise was given as part of an exchange.80 As such, the language required to satisfy the
consideration doctrine “commodifies” a promise—that is, turns the promise into a commodity
that is exchanged for another commodity. Commodification of this sort can violate strong social
taboos. These taboos serve to make the consideration doctrine effectively unavailable in certain
social circumstances, preventing parties from employing even the pretense of consideration.
Scholars who write about commodification do not fully understand the phenomenon.81
We lack a consensus understanding for what categories of transactions are subject to
commodification and how these categories change over time. Nevertheless, there is widespread
agreement that social norms prohibit certain forms of transactions on account of their
commodifying nature. In this Part, we look to three branches of knowledge: (1) sociology and
anthropology, (2) philosophy and political theory, and (3) economics and game theory.
Although the three scholarly fields rely on different methodologies, they reach similar
conclusions about the commodification phenomenon. All three approaches support the existence
of anti-commodification norms, and all three conclude that these norms govern transactions
where the relationships between the transacting parties or the social messages sent by the
transactions are more important than the desire to transfer goods or services. On the other hand,
when parties transact with the primary purpose of exchanging goods or services, anticommodification norms seldom apply.

80

Even in the case of sham consideration, the parties must still claim that consideration is present.
For a good sample of the recent controversies surrounding commodification, see Carol M. Rose, Whither
Commodification? (Forthcoming; Partial manuscript on file with authors).
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A. Commodification in Sociology and Anthropology
Sociologists and anthropologists have long recognized that market exchanges and giftgiving represent drastically different social phenomena and that the norms governing the former
are very different from those governing the latter.82 Whereas individuals engaged in a market
context are expected to exhibit rational calculation based on personal self-interest, explicit
considerations of monetary gain are taboo in relationships involving gifts. Indeed, such nonreciprocal interactions are said to involve a wholly different manner of thinking.83
Although not all sociologists and anthropologists use the term commodification, there is
widespread agreement that the language and behavior used for market exchanges are often
inappropriate for gifts and for certain other forms of non-market transactions. Anyone who
conducts a gift transaction using the behavior reserved for market exchanges risks commodifying
the transaction and thereby violating social norms.
What accounts for the dichotomy between gift transactions and market exchanges?
While market exchanges are utilitarian in nature, serving a discrete purpose and requiring no
prolonged relationship between the involved parties, gift-giving is a means by which two
“The classic distinction between
individuals establish an ongoing social intimacy.84
commodities and gifts is that while commodity exchange is concerned with establishing
equivalencies between the value of objects, ‘gifts’ are primarily about relations between
people.”85 The gift comes to represent the value of the relationship, instilling the gift with a
“totemic” quality that distinguishes it from a regular market commodity.86
As a result, gift-giving “must be based, or purport to be based, on affective or moral
motives, and it may not be expressly required by the terms of the original transfer or viewed by
the parties as the price of the original transfer.”87 Any outward sign that a gift has been assigned
a monetary value, by either the donor or the donee, is strictly forbidden.88 For a donee to offer to
compensate a donor for a gift would be to suggest that the donee has put a price on the gift—and,
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See, e.g., DAVID GRAEBER, TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUE 32 (2001); LEWIS HYDE, THE
GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 62-66 (1979); G. PALMER, ALTRUISM: ITS NATURE AND
VARIETIES 60 (1920).
83
See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 196 (1989) (“The personal, connected
quality of giving may require the donor to employ modes of thinking quite different from those appropriate to the
market. Some believe that economic transfers call for detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit
terms which are inappropriate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts.”); Carol M. Rose, supra note 148, at 32
(“[M]arketizing some human activities inappropriately makes us talk about them differently, and talking about them
differently can make us think about them differently.”). But see MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND
FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 1 [1927] (1954 Trans. Ian Cunnison) (“The form usually taken is
that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behavior is formal pretence and social deception, while the
transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest.”).
84
See, e.g., Gretchen M. Herrmann, Women’s Exchange in the U.S. Garage Sale: Giving Gifts and Creating
Community, 10 GENDER & SOCIETY 703, 710-11 (1996) (“‘It is the cardinal difference between gift and commodity
exchange that a gift establishes a feeling-bond between two people, while the sale of a commodity leaves no
necessary connection.’” (quoting LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 56
(1983)).
85
GRAEBER, supra note 82, at 32.
86
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 844-45 (1997).
87
Id. at 843.
88
See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 172-73 (1988 trans. Richard Nice).
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by implication, the relationship.89 Similarly, a donor “cannot demand or require reciprocity
without disqualifying her transfer as a gift”90 and thereby demoting the status of her relationship
with the donee. Thus, bargaining, which requires an articulation and discussion of the object’s
value by both donor and donee, cannot take place within the gift-giving relationship.
Consequently, the social context of gift-giving is incompatible with the consideration
form. To claim that a gift promise is being exchanged for something in return—the essence of
the consideration doctrine—is to violate the social rules surrounding the gift-giving relationship.
Attempts to invoke the consideration form can commodify a transaction by suggesting that a
price is being placed on the social interaction.
The distinction between gift-giving and market exchanges is not always clear-cut.
Interactions that are ostensibly market-based may be constitutive of a relationship that requires
its participants to adopt many of the outward indications of friendship. A supplier may have a
very cordial ongoing relationship with his distributor, requiring that he refrain from exacting as
great profits as possible when he knows the distributor is pressed for cash. Similarly, gift-giving
may be employed as a means of facilitating future economic transactions.91 But the basic point
remains that reciprocation and negotiation—the explicit articulation of and bargaining over
value—are frequently precluded in some gift-exchange scenarios due to social norms.
A possible objection to the above might dispute whether gift exchanges are truly nonreciprocal. Certainly, the giving of any particular gift may be uncompensated in the sense that its
transfer does not result in immediate monetary payment, but the gift may be given with the
expectation of a return gift in the future, and such expectation of repayment is enforced through
rigid social norms. If A gives B a birthday present, B may be obliged to respond in kind. As
Marcel Mauss wrote in his classic treatise on gift-giving, “In theory such gifts are voluntary but
in fact they are given and repaid under obligation.”92 Though accounting need not be one-forone, anyone allowing himself to fall too far in another’s debt risks loss of face or even ostracism.
And even if the price of a gift is not a return gift, the donor may expect a return on her
“beneficence” in the form of social esteem or some other non-material compensation. In the
words of one anthropologist, “When people act in ways that seem economically irrational, this is
only because the values they are maximizing are not material.”93 Although the norms governing
gift-exchange do not permit the participants to explicitly acknowledge that their behavior is
motivated by self-interest, this may nonetheless be the primary motive.94
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But while the underlying motivation of gift-giving may be self-interest, what is relevant
for our purposes is that gift-exchange participants are barred from any outward acknowledgment
of this motivation. Social norms require a “formal pretense and social deception”95 that forbids
any discussion of compensation between gift-exchange participants. Even when the parties are
transacting based on purely selfish motives, the gift-giving context prevents the articulation of
these motives in the manner required to invoke consideration.
Consider Walzer’s discussion of the Kula exchange among the Trobiander islanders,
[The Kula] isn’t a ‘trade’ in our sense of the word: necklaces and bracelets ‘can never be
exchanged from hand to hand, with the equivalence between the two objects discussed,
bargained about and computed.’ The exchange has the form of a series of gifts. . . . [Contrast
this with] what Malinowski calls ‘trade, pure and simple’ and what the islanders call gimwali.
Here the trade is in commodities, not ritual objects; and it is entirely legitimate to bargain, to
haggle, to seek private advantage. The gimwali is free; it can be carried on between any two
strangers; and the striking of a bargain terminates the transaction. The islanders draw a sharp
line between this sort of trade and the exchange of gifts. When criticizing bad conduct in the
Kula, they will say ‘it was done like a gimwali.’96

The Kula presents a prime example of the social restrictions on gift-giving transactions.
Kula transactions are highly ritualized. Even though Kula are given as part of an exchange,
where the gift of a Kula imposes obligations on the recipient, the participants are precluded from
explicitly voicing cost-benefit motives or consideration-type language. The same phenomenon
characterizes many gift-giving transactions in modern American society. As Carol Rose writes,
there are “occasions on which gifts are appropriate but cash is not. Bringing a bottle of wine to
the dinner party will be just fine, and may even be expected, but paying its price in cash would
offend the host.”97 Just as the Kula exchange cannot be “done like a gimwali,” many modern
forms of gift-giving preclude the use of market-oriented language and behavior. Gifts may be
exchanged in a ritualistic fashion, but the parties may not bargain over these transactions or
explicitly acknowledge that the gifts are given in order to receive something in return.
Not all theorists agree that affective and economic interactions occur in wholly distinct
social arenas. The sociologist Viviania Zelizer, for example, forcefully disputes this “Hostile
Worlds” paradigm—her label for the dominant view of the gift-giving relationship among
sociologists and anthropologists.98 Eschewing the notion that monetary transactions are
impossible among social intimates or that market participants are incapable of affective
relationships, she argues that real-world interactions cannot be reduced to a simple either/or
dichotomy. On the one hand, participants engaged in ostensibly “market behavior” often
demonstrate a concern for one another that cannot be ascribed merely to economic self-interest.
For example, a recent study of home care workers and their patients demonstrates that genuine
bonds of friendship develop during what might be characterized as fee-for-service transactions.99
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Though they undeniably engage in market behavior, it is impossible to accurately describe these
actors as mere market participants.100
And on the other hand, social relationships—even deeply intimate ones—often involve
monetary transactions: “[P]arents give their children allowances, subsidize their college
educations, help them with their first mortgage, and offer them substantial bequests in their wills.
Friends and relatives send gifts of money as wedding presents, and friends loan each other
money. Immigrants dispatch remittances to kinfolk back home.”101 To claim that all human
interactions can be categorized as either “economic” or “social” is to ignore the complexity that
attends real-world relationships.102 Instead, it is necessary to recognize that different types of
monetary transfers take place within different types of relationships.103
While such an admonition against reductionism is well taken, it does not undermine the
basic premise of our argument: that explicit market-oriented articulations are off-limits in certain
social relationships. Though norms might permit—and even encourage—a parent to loan her
child money to help with the down payment on a house, a parent who charges her child a
premium “because you’re such a poor credit risk” would likely run afoul of taboos. Transactions
involving money may not per se be impossible among social intimates, but the conditions under
which transfers may be proposed, discussed, and completed are much more limited than those
acceptable for market transactions—even if the market participants do not treat each other
merely as tools of personal gain. That different forms of monetary transactions are permissible
within different relationships does not defeat the basic argument, so long as contexts remain in
which parties cannot specifically articulate consideration.
To summarize, even if we reject the dominant “hostile worlds” paradigm, we can still
conclude that social norms prevent parties from voicing consideration for certain non-market
transactions. The explicit quid-pro-quo language needed to invoke consideration risks
expressing utilitarian motives and thus commodifying the relationship. Non-commodifiable gift
transactions often operate within a highly ritualized social space where the message conveyed by
a gift is more important than the gift itself. Muddying such gifts with consideration language can
be viewed as rude and offensive, potentially undermining the feelings of trust and affection that
form the basis of these non-market relationships.
B. Commodification in Philosophy and Political Theory
Commodification in philosophy and political theory arises from the concept of spheres.
Sphere-oriented theorists usually place market exchanges into one sphere and non-market
transactions, or at least certain forms of non-market transactions, into another sphere.104 The use
100

See Susan Himmelweit, Caring Labor, in Emotional Labor in the Service Economy, ANNALS OF AMER.
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCI., Jan. 1999, 27, 32 (Ronnie J. Steinberg and Deborah M. Figart, eds., special
issue) (“It is not so much that we are adding an element of the unpaid to the paid but that paid relationships
themselves can include strong feelings and personal attachments.”).
101
Zelizer, supra note 98, at 7.
102
See id. at 6-7 (arguing that the idea “that money and intimacy represent contradictory principles whose
intersection generates conflict” represents a “failure to recognize how regularly intimate social transactions coexist
with monetary transactions”).
103
See id. at 9. See generally VIVIAN A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994).
104
Theorists disagree about the number and classification of spheres. For instance, Sandel argues for three spheres –
for market goods, civic goods, and sacred goods. Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of
Markets, 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 94, 112 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000). In contrast,

23

COMMODIFICATIONAND CONTRACT FORMATION

of market-oriented behavior or language within the non-market sphere is deemed corrupting.105
More specifically, these theorists “suggest that there are various ‘spheres’ (sometimes called
‘modes’) of valuation, and an exchange is corrupting when it ignores the differences between
these spheres of valuation and forces us to value all goods in the same way.”106 The value
premises behind transactions in the non-market sphere are considered “incommensurable” with
the value premises of the market sphere. Mixing these value premises does “violence to our
considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”107
Even though the sale of non-market-sphere goods is impermissible, these goods may still
be given as gifts as long as the transactions take place without the use of market-oriented
language. So whereas baby-selling is taboo, adoption is fully acceptable.108 Where the sale of
organs is controversial, organ donation is laudable.109 And while prostitution is highly frowned
upon, the free exchange of sexual favors is not equally condemned. As long as the participants
in a gift transaction eschew the bargain form, they can usually complete non-market sphere
exchanges without violating social norms. The key distinction is that parties cannot explicitly
articulate consideration-type language or explicitly contemplate consideration-type motives. A
suitor may give jewelry in the hopes of receiving sexual favors, and the recipient may reward the
gift by providing such favors. Yet if the parties openly acknowledge that the jewelry is being
exchanged for sex, or bargain over the transaction, the exchange is labeled prostitution and
becomes taboo. Similarly, adopting parents are allowed to pay for certain of the birth mother’s
expenses, but not for the actual child. Any suggestion that payments are made in order to induce
the birth mother to give up her child would violate both social norms and the laws of most
states.110
At the risk of vastly oversimplifying the literature, we divide sphere-oriented theories
into two general categories based on their rationales for keeping the spheres distinct. First,
consequentialist approaches worry about the corrupting force of market imperialism. In the
words of one scholar, “the application of market rhetoric to non-commodifiable matters coarsens
our understanding of these matters, leading us into mistakes, loosening our moral grasp, and
undermining our ties to others.”111 For instance, “[f]rom a conservative perspective, this is the
problem with marriage. Contract obligations in this intimate setting, it is said, could make the
married partners talk and think about their individual entitlements, undermining the moral
foundation of sharing that should permeate their relationship.”112 Ever since Titmuss’s classic
work on blood donation, scholars have recognized that allowing market-form transactions into
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the non-market sphere can undermine the social norms and relationships needed for the nonmarket sphere to function.113 Once some people are paid for their blood, blood donation may
lose its expressive character as a duty of good community-members. Or as Kimbrell writes, “If I
buy a Nobel Prize, I corrupt the meaning of the Nobel Prize.”114 Similarly, conducting a
friendship based on explicit cost-benefit analysis corrupts the meaning of the friendship
relationship.
As an alternative form of consequentialist argument, Michael Walzer famously claimed
that humans flourish within many different spheres of activity.115 Inevitably, human relations
become unequal within individual spheres—as employers dominate employees, doctors
dominate patients, and the wealthy dominate the poor. Yet Justice requires that we not allow
unequal power within one sphere to be leveraged into unequal power in other spheres. No
person should be able to dominate another within all spheres of human activity. The non-market
spheres must, therefore, be shielded from market logic in order to prevent disparities in wealth
and market power from creating complete inequality across multiple spheres. If the wealthy
were allowed to explicitly purchase friendship, romance, or esteem; inequities in wealth would
engender more widespread and insidious forms of inequality and injustice.116
Whereas consequentialist arguments focus on the social consequences of market
imperialism, dignity-oriented theories claim that subjecting non-market relationships to bargainform logic directly harms the object of this commodification. Non-market goods and
relationships are thought to be infused with an inherent dignity. Subjecting these goods or
relationships to market language and behavior represents a failure to accord them with the
respect they reserve. Elizabeth Anderson labels “the mode of valuation appropriate to pure
commodities ‘use.’”117 She claims that “Use is a lower, impersonal, and exclusive mode of
valuation. It is contrasted with higher modes of valuation, such as respect. To merely use
something is to subordinate it to one’s own ends, without regard for its intrinsic value.”118
Dignity-based arguments draw support from Kant’s categorical imperative against
treating humans only as a means.119 Due respect for human dignity and autonomy requires that
people be regarded as ends in themselves. Expanding on this logic, modern dignity-oriented
theorists have argued that a wide variety of goods—such as environmental resources—similarly
deserve to be treated as ends in themselves.120 Viewing a good or relationship as an end
prohibits bargaining in a manner that suggests the good or relationship is valued solely for its use
potential.
Another form of dignity-based argument claims the use of market language denies the
uniqueness of the object of the bargain. “Market rhetoric assumes that everything can be traded
113
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for everything else, and that through the medium of money, all is fungible.”121 For people or
goods with inherent dignity, this assertion of fungibility offends the sense of uniqueness and selfworth. For example, your “children might be frightened and confused if they hear you talk about
the market for babies.”122 No child should have to wonder about their market value; neither
should a friend or intimate. Bargaining over goods with inherent dignity results in “simplifying
and flattening of all nuance, idiosyncrasy, and sentiment, not only for the speaker of this rhetoric
but for the hearers as well.”123 Proper respect for non-market goods and relationships requires
recognition of their non-fungibility. Explicitly suggesting that these goods or relationships can
be exchanged for something of value undermines their claims to uniqueness and inherent dignity.
A favor rendered by a friend is not the same as a service purchased in the market and should not
be treated as though it were.
The commodification literature in philosophy and political theory is controversial. Some
market adherents call for removing barriers to commodification and expanding the scope of the
market, while proponents of anti-commodification norms often wish to strengthen these norms
through acts of law. We lack general agreement about the proper scope of the non-market sphere
or about the rationales for protecting the sphere from market rhetoric and logic. Nevertheless,
there is widespread consensus that norms shield at least some forms of non-market transactions
from bargain-form language. And few call for completely abolishing the non-market sphere; no
one wants to reestablish slavery or to force intimates to explicitly negotiate every aspect of their
relationships. The literature from Philosophy and Political Theory adds support for the existence
of anti-commodification norms and explains potential rationales for the function of these norms.
C. Commodification in Economics and Game Theory
Economists seldom concern themselves with concepts like commodification. A basic
tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that individuals act as rational agents. Almost by
definition, rational agents would be unlikely to deny themselves the use of a legally binding form
merely on account of social norms. However, there are several branches of game theory
literature which develop a concept similar to commodification.
In order to explain how commodification works within the game theory literature, we
categorize promises as being of four types based on the motives of the promisor.124 Our schema
labels promises as either exchange-oriented, trust-building, status-enhancing, or altruistic.125
Promisors make exchange-oriented promises in order to receive a defined benefit from promisees
in recognition of their promise. In contrast, promisors make trust-building promises in order to
receive undefined benefits from a promisee. These promisors typically seek to develop goodwill
in order to later benefit from their relationship with the promisee. Examples of trust-building
promises include the lavish gifts law firms bestow on summer associates and the gifts
businessmen make in the hopes of securing an eventual business relationship.126 Similarly,
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status-enhancing promises are meant to build promisors’ reputations with the outside society.
For example, promisors may seek a reputation for being charitable or for being a good family
member, friend, or community leader. Certain gifts to charities are among the most obvious
forms of status-enhancing gifts, and the status-enhancing motive likely explains why so few
large charitable gifts are made anonymously.127 Finally, altruistic promisors care about
promisees and benefit from improving their promisees’ welfare. In the language of economics,
these promisors have interdependent utility functions with the promisees they wish to help.
Promisors may operate out of a combination of two or more of these motives, but the
general point remains that different motives will dominate for different transactions. To the
extent game theory sheds light on anti-commodification norms, these norms will primarily
operate for trust-building and status-enhancing promises.
Looking first to status-enhancing promises, promisors may wish to be viewed as
charitable or to be seen as a good friends, family-members, or participants in other social
relationships. In other words, the status-enhancing motivation often involves promisors seeking
to gain the appearance of being altruistic, whether the altruism is in general or is oriented toward
a specific group or purpose. But there is a difference between being viewed as someone who
wants to be seen as charitable and being viewed as someone who actually is charitable. Costbenefit type language can make it appear that a promise is being made for instrumental purposes.
Phrasing a promise in bargain form can undermine the promise’s status-enhancing potential.
Douglas Bernheim has developed a model which supports this result.128 Since one’s
charitable nature is not directly observable, status-seekers try to signal their beneficence by
making public gifts. Their goal is to mimic the actions of those who actually are charitable. As
such, status-seekers must take care not to reveal their actual motivations by departing from the
behavior of a truly altruistic donor. If the status-seekers give the appearance that they are trying
to gain something in return for their gifts, they may inadvertently reveal their status-seeking
motives. Hence, a specific agreement for a charitable recipient to publicize a gift or to grant the
donor special privileges can diminish the amount of status the donor receives from the gift. This
is not to suggest that recipient organizations do not publicize gifts or grant donors special
privileges. However, a gift’s status-enhancing potential is maximized when the recipients make
it appear that they are publicizing a gift of their own accord, rather than at the request of the
donor. The use of consideration language can render a promisor’s motivations in making these
gifts too overt.
This problem is not as severe when a status-enhancing promise is exchanged for a dollar
rather than for special privileges granted by the promisee. Still, the public might wonder why the
contracting parties deem it necessary to go to such lengths to secure a promise through law. If
the promisee believed the promisor to be truly charitable, the promisee should not worry about
the promisor later reneging. That a promisee seeks legal assurances that the promise will be
fulfilled might be taken to indicate that the promisee suspects the promisor is status-seeking
rather than altruistic. Consequently, if the parties claim that a promise is being exchanged for
something of actual value, the public may believe that the promisor is motivated more by the
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desire to gain the item of value than by charitable inclinations. But if the parties claim that a
promise is being exchanged for a mere trifle, the public may believe that the promisee does not
trust the promisor’s motives. In either case, voicing consideration can suggest that a promisor
merely seeks the appearance of being charitable rather than actually being charitable.
The same conclusion holds when status-seeking promisors wish to be known for
possessing qualities other than charity. For example, Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad have
constructed a model in which donors seek to gain status on account of being wealthy.129 Since
wealth is not directly observable, and since conspicuous consumption can only take one so far,
these donors try to signal their wealth by making lavish donations. These donations provide the
promisors with a means of signaling that is both public and too expensive for the less wealthy to
mimic. The moderately wealthy may purchase a yacht if they truly enjoy yachting, but only the
extremely wealthy are likely to donate massive sums without seeking personal benefit; only the
extremely wealthy can donate on a whim. The moderately wealthy are far more likely to take
precautions to insure that their donations create the intended result.
As such, when promisors appear to be seeking something in return for their donations—
when the donations are made using the bargain form—the donations may lose some of their
potential to signal extreme wealth. If the promise is exchanged for something of value, the
promisor may be viewed as greatly desiring the item of value rather than as donating because the
costs of doing so are low. And if the promise is exchanged for something of negligible value, the
public may wonder why the parties felt the need to make their promise legally binding; perhaps
the promisee was concerned the promisor would no longer be able to afford the promise if her
economic situation worsened before performance?
Regardless of what form of status they pursue, status-seeking promisors cannot reveal the
signaling motivations for their promises. Articulating consideration or using cost-benefit
language threatens to undermine the message these promisors wish to send.
Similar conclusions follow for trust-building promises. Economists have increasingly
come to realize that legal sanctions are insufficient for monitoring long-term interdependent
relationships.130 Courts simply lack the ability to verify that parties fulfill all aspects of an
agreement in good faith. Colin Camerer uses a signaling model to explain how parties can make
trust-building gifts in order to signal their reliability as a contractual partner.131 The gifts serve
to distinguish relationship-builders from opportunists, where relationship-builders sincerely
desire a long-term relationship and opportunists seek to benefit by taking advantage of the other
party’s trust. By giving gifts that are expensive for opportunists to mimic, relationship-builders
can demonstrate their commitment to the donee.
However, if the donors try to negotiate over the terms of a gift or speak about a gift using
cost-benefit language, they may be viewed as opportunists who are attempting to mimic the
signals sent by relationship-builders. Even suggesting that the promisee offer a penny in return
for a promise in order to make it legally binding may suggest that the promisor believes the
promisee needs reassurance of the promisor’s intentions. The promisee may wonder if the
promisor has a reputation for being unreliable that is unknown to the promisee. When parties
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truly desire long-term cooperative relationships, they must learn to trust one another for promises
that the law cannot enforce. Beginning a relationship with a suggestion that a promise is not
trustworthy unless it can be made legally binding raises questions, at the very least.
Similarly, if promisees try to bargain over the conditions of a gift, they may be viewed as
opportunists who want to take the gift without being interested in the long-term relationship.
Any proposal that bargain-form language be used to invoke the consideration doctrine might be
taken as evidence of insincere behavior. In the words of Eric Posner,
Attempting to bargain over a trust-enhancing gift is terribly improper, as it suggests that the
donee is neither a cooperator who seeks a relationship nor a cooperator who does not seek this
particular relationship, but rather an opportunist seeking to get a signaling gift at no cost to
himself—something that would be in the interests of no one to admit.132

The social norms against commodifying gift-giving transactions correspond with the
signaling-based motives of status-enhancing and trust-building promises. For both types of
promises, articulating consideration can undermine the signals that the promises are intended to
convey. Game theory explains a process by which the norms against voicing consideration in
gift-giving relationships may have arisen. As successive generations of parties internalized the
appropriate behavior for gift-giving relationships, this behavior may have begun to seem natural;
parties may have forgotten the original rationale for the limitations on what behavior feels
suitable for gift-giving transactions. Even thinking about these transactions using cost-benefit
rationales may have come to feel inappropriate.
Of course, these results are somewhat speculative. We do not claim that the
consideration form is always unavailable for status-enhancing and trust-building promises. But
the evidence from Sociology and Anthropology strongly suggests that there exist categories of
gratuitous promisors who cannot articulate consideration due to social norms, and the literature
from Philosophy and Political Theory provides additional support for this conclusion. The game
theory models discussed in this section add both further support and another potential
explanation for the proposition. At the very least, the signaling-based motivations of trustbuilding and status-enhancing promisors have probably played a role in the development of the
norms against commodifying gift-giving relationships.
D. Drawing Conclusions from the Literature
Controversy rages over the nature and scope of commodification. Studies of the topic
have yet to reach a point for us to accurately predict when norms will block specific transactions.
As such, our discussion of anti-commodification norms has been necessarily vague. We offer
few specific examples and the examples we do give tend to the extreme—such as transactions
over sex or transactions regarding ritual objects in tribal cultures. We use these extreme
examples because they best illustrate our argument.
Nevertheless, we believe that anti-commodification norms also operate for routine
transactions that occur throughout the economy. We believe these norms frequently govern gift
promises given to foster market exchanges as well as promises made within social relationships
such as those between friends, family members, and neighbors. Although the literature is not
sufficiently mature to prove this point, we suspect that there are also a multitude of transactions
132
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made within economic relationships—particularly among ongoing business partners—for which
the explicit use of bargain-oriented language would be awkward, if not taboo.
Despite the underdeveloped state of the literature, we can still reach a few conclusions
about anti-commodification norms. We can be fairly confident that these norms deter at least
some parties from articulating consideration. There is widespread agreement that social spaces
exist wherein explicit bargaining is prohibited. Moreover, the three branches of knowledge
make similar predictions about the general types of transactions for which anti-commodification
norms are likely to apply.
Sociologists and anthropologists tell us that non-commodifiable transactions are highly
ritualized, serving primarily to establish social intimacy or to solidify relationships, as opposed
to merely resulting in a transfer of goods. Similarly, philosophers theorize that anticommodification norms guard the non-market sphere—the norms function to prevent market
forces from corrupting intimate relationships, to shield goods and relationships infused with
inherent dignity from assaults by market-oriented language and logic, or to block those with
market resources from purchasing power within other spheres of human activity. Finally, Game
Theory shows how voicing consideration in trust-building and status-enhancing transactions can
undermine the signaling-based purposes of these transactions.
Although the three branches of knowledge employ different methodologies, they reach
similar results. All three approaches conclude that anti-commodification norms govern
transactions where the relationships between the transacting parties or the social messages sent
by the transactions are more important than the actual exchange of goods or services. When a
promisor seeks only to give something of value to a promisee, anti-commodification norms do
not usually come into play. Instead, non-commodifiable transactions are ritual-oriented or
signaling-based. They operate within a realm of social activity in which market logic is
subordinated to other purposes, where parties seek non-market values like friendship or esteem.
Although the dividing lines are blurry, there exists both a market sphere where commodifying
language is fully acceptable and a more relationship-oriented sphere where such language is
taboo. By enforcing only promises backed by at least nominal consideration, courts can limit
legal enforcement to promises made within the market sphere while avoiding entanglement with
the personal domain.
Of course, even when norms frown on the use of consideration, some parties will
inevitably ignore these norms and take whatever steps are required to make their promises
legally binding. Moreover, the content of anti-commodification norms is likely to change over
time and amongst subcultures. And consideration may be available through ritualized
“gentleman’s agreements” even in circumstances where other forms of bargain-type behavior
would be prohibited. When looking beyond the extreme cases, we cannot know whether and to
what extent anti-commodification norms actually apply.
But this ambiguity supports the central premise of our paper. We wish to dissuade courts
from trying to determine the specific circumstances wherein promises backed by nominal
consideration should be binding. Instead of creating one rule for option and guarantee promises,
another for interfamilial promises, and further rules for still other type of promises, we call for a
single rule to be applied to all cases. By making nominal consideration both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for a promise to be enforced, we would rely on the parties to demonstrate
when they are able to overcome any extant anti-commodification norms.
Without further analysis, we cannot evaluate the normative implications of the limits
anti-commodification norms place on access to nominal consideration. Looking to the principle
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of honoring parties' intentions, it might seem like we should abandon the use of consideration
and provide parties with a method for enforcing their promises that is more readily available.
Yet, as the next two Parts will demonstrate, anti-commodification norms only block access to
consideration in circumstances wherein parties should generally prefer to not have a means for
making their promises legally binding. In order to understand this counter-intuitive argument,
we must first address the assumption that parties only choose to make their promises legally
obligating when they actually desire the promises to be enforced. The next Part shows how
parties’ expressed intentions may not reflect their underlying desires.
III. THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING
When starting from the principle of respecting parties’ intentions at the time of contract
formation, the consideration doctrine is a bit puzzling. The doctrine serves to deny legal
enforcement even when the parties clearly wish their promises to be binding. No matter how
unequivocally the parties communicate a desire to be bound, the doctrine calls for ignoring the
parties’ declared wishes unless consideration is present.
The previous Part demonstrated that anti-commodification norms block some parties
from invoking nominal consideration. Hence, even when courts enforce promises backed by
nominal consideration, not all parties can make use of the consideration form. To the extent that
we rely on the consideration doctrine as a means for parties to bind themselves, the law will
sometimes be unable to effectuate parties’ expressed wishes. Under the traditional assumption
that parties’ expressed wishes correspond with their true desires, our discussion of anticommodification norms would cast substantial doubt on the consideration doctrine. After all,
anti-commodification norms prevent many parties from invoking consideration even when they
want their promises to be binding. Instead of looking to consideration, perhaps we should seek a
less-restrictive form, such as enforcing all promises where the parties declare in writing a desire
for legal enforcement.
But the traditional assumption is flawed; parties stated intentions do not necessarily
reflect their true desires. Just because a promisor states her intention to make her promise
binding does not mean she desires the option to be bound. This idea can be illustrated by a
simple example: A professor worries that a few of her students may be confused and thus
decides to hold an optional class session at 7 o’clock on a Friday morning. When numerous
bleary-eyed students show up, the professor assumes that more students were confused than she
originally thought and pats herself on the back for being so generous—after all, the students
would not have attended if the costs of doing so outweighed the benefits. Though the professor
sacrificed her own sleep in order to hold the extra session, she was glad to do so to assist her
students, who obviously needed the extra help, since otherwise they would not have attended the
class.
The professor’s error is obvious. If she schedules an optional class, her students may
choose to attend it, but this does not necessarily mean they needed extra help. The attending
students may not require any additional assistance, but may merely seek to prevent the professor
from thinking they are putting in less effort on account of their not attending the extra session.133
Both the professor and the students may have been better off without the optional class. The
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This result is particularly likely if the Professor grades even partially based on student effort. But the result is
possible as long as students suspect that the Professor might take her perception of their effort into account.
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mere fact that students choose to attend the class once offered does not indicate that they wanted
the class to be offered in the first place. Contrary to the professor’s beliefs, the principle of
honoring students’ desires does not support holding the optional class session.
An analogous dynamic applies to a promisor’s choice of whether to secure her promises
through law. When promisors have the option to legally bind themselves, promisors who choose
not to exercise that option may send a negative signal to promisees about their intention to
perform. Promisors who do not make their promises binding look insincere compared to those
who do. As a result, in order to avoid looking insincere, promisors may render their promises
binding even though they would prefer not to. When the option for legal enforcement is not
available, on the other hand, there is no worry that the wrong signal will be sent. Nothing about
a promisor’s intentions can be deduced from the fact that her promise is not binding.
Like the students who attend the make-up session, promisors may exercise the option for
legal enforcement even if they wish the option didn’t exist. The mere fact that parties choose to
employ a legally binding form does not mean that they benefit from the existence of that form.
When promisors have the option to legally secure their promises in order to demonstrate their
sincerity to promisees, they may actually end up worse off than if no such option existed. To
respect parties’ true desires might actually require taking away the option for the legal
enforcement of promises.
This Part describes the intuitions behind the problem of inefficient signaling and outlines
the assumptions we use to model the problem. When inefficient signaling takes place, promisors
may bind themselves even when they would prefer not to have the option to be bound. The
formal analysis proving this result can be found in Appendices A and B.
Appendix A contains the first part of our formal proof. The Appendix adapts a gametheoretic model developed by Phillippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin.134 Their work is part of
a well-known branch of scholarship building on an earlier piece by Rothschild and Stiglitz.135
We do not present the Aghion-Hermalin model in full. Instead, we show how the question of
enforcing promises fits the conditions needed for the model to apply. Appendix A forgoes
equations and the direct use of mathematics. Instead, the logic behind the model is explained
through a series of graphs.
Appendix B extends the Aghion-Hermalin analysis by presenting a model of our own
design. The Aghion-Hermalin model proves most of the results needed for our justification of
the consideration doctrine, but the model was not designed with the consideration doctrine in
mind and thus leaves gaps in our story. Most importantly, the Aghion-Hermalin model is unable
to show how the creation of a legally binding option can harm promisees as well as promisors.
Appendix B remedies this deficiency. Although based on Aghion and Hermalin’s work, our
model in Appendix B is simplified in order to meet the space requirements of a law journal
article. The model should be viewed as an extension of Aghion and Hermalin’s work, not as a
piece of analysis intended to stand on its own.
Although the results of this Part depend on the formal models in the appendices for
support, the body of the Part provides a conceptual explanation of the inefficient signaling
problem. We hope this explanation should suffice for most readers. In order to situate our
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conceptual overview of the problem, we also explain the major assumptions behind our formal
models of inefficient signaling.
A. The Assumptions Behind Inefficient Signaling Spirals
Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to specify four assumptions underlying our
approach. Although these assumptions are not strictly necessary for the conceptual argument
contained in the body of this Part, we believe it important to explain the assumptions upon which
we base the formal proof for our argument.
Our assumptions are as follows: First, we adopt a welfare-maximization framework.
Second, we employ an offer-acceptance model. Third, we assume parties have asymmetric
information. And fourth, we define promises and contracts as containing only two terms.
To begin with, we utilize a welfare-maximization framework, which seeks to maximize
the overall benefit to all involved parties—that is, all promisors and promisees. We use this
framework because we lack cause for prioritizing the desires of specific promisors or promisees.
When looking to whether parties would desire to have a legally binding option for a category of
promises, we need a method for determining group preferences in cases where individual
members of the group might disagree. We assume that groups will—or at least should—choose
the option that maximizes the overall welfare of the group. We do not concern ourselves with
the distribution of gains and losses amongst the members of a group.136
As our second assumption, we employ an offer-acceptance model of promising. We
view promisors as rationally making offers in order to obtain some specific benefit. This benefit
can be something of monetary value offered by the promisee in return for the promise.
Alternatively, the benefit can come from altruistic motives or from the desire to develop trust or
status.137 Regardless, promisors fashion an offer and then look to see whether they can gain their
desired level of benefit from making the promise. In the case of market exchanges, a promisor’s
offer would be followed by the promisee’s acceptance or rejection. If the offer is rejected, the
promisor can then fashion a new offer with different terms. In the case of gratuitous promises,
we model promisors as first deciding the minimum benefit they would need to receive in order to
make promising worthwhile, and then looking to see whether they would actually receive this
benefit from making the promise. If the expected benefit falls below the minimum threshold,
this counts as a rejection, and the promisors can then repeat the process by calculating a
minimum threshold for a new promise/offer. Of course, the offer-acceptance approach is not the
only method for modeling promising. The parties might instead bargain amongst themselves and
jointly set the terms of the promise, or gratuitous promisors might start by calculating the
expected benefit rather than the minimum threshold. Nevertheless, we employ the offeracceptance model because it greatly simplifies our analysis and strikes us as a reasonable
approximation of how many promises are made.138
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We do not claim that distribution is unimportant as a general matter. When individuals differ with respect to
morally relevant characteristics—such as their existing level of wealth—distributive concerns may trump the goal of
welfare maximization. But we do not view one’s status as a promisor or promisee or one’s probability of being able
to fulfill a promise as morally relevant characteristics.
137
See supra Part II.C.
138
As the modeling task would be prohibitively difficult, we have not tested whether our results are robust to
relaxing the offer/acceptance assumption. But we see no reason for thinking that our results depend on this
assumption.
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For our third assumption, we specify that parties have asymmetric information.
Specifically, we view promisors as having better information about the probability that they will
be able to fulfill their promises than do promisees. Since individuals are generally the best
judges of their future actions, this assumption seems reasonable.139 Yet promisees only care
about promises to the extent they view them as reliable. A promisee will not generally offer
much in exchange for a promise she believes is unlikely to be fulfilled. Consequently, the
benefit promisors receive from making a promise partially depends on their perceived reliability.
This result applies to gratuitous promises as well as to exchange promises.140 Unable to assess
promisor reliability directly, a promisee evaluates a promisor’s likelihood of performance based
on the average reliability of all promisors with similar observable characteristics.
Since promisors benefit from being viewed as reliable, it is worth asking why promisors
with a high probability of performance cannot simply communicate that information to
promisees. The answer is that promisors with below-average probabilities of performance may
mimic the communications made by more reliable promisors. A promisor might tell a promisee
that she is very likely to perform, but the promisee cannot know whether the promisor is
speaking truthfully or is falsely attempting to increase the perception of her reliability in order to
gain more from making the promise. Only by taking concrete actions such as making a promise
legally binding can promisors increase their perceived reliability.
Our last assumption is particularly important. We only make this final assumption in
order to demonstrate the conclusions of this Part. Looking ahead to Part IV, we show how this
assumption—that promises contain only two terms—holds only under certain conditions. We
then show how this fact justifies the consideration doctrine.
With that preface, our fourth assumption defines promises and contracts as containing
only two terms—(1) the size of the promise, and (2) the level of sanctions for breaching. The
size of the promise refers to the amount a promisor pledges to the promisee. Equivalently, the
term measures the value the promisee receives if the promise is fulfilled. The level of sanctions
refers to the negative consequences to the promisor in the case of breach. Sanctions include both
any damages imposed by law and any stigma that would result from social norms against breach.
In order to build the models described in this Part, we assume that these terms completely define
the content of all promises and contracts.
We make a few additional assumptions when constructing the formal models in our
appendixes, but those additional assumptions are less important for understanding the intuitions
behind our results.141
139

There may be circumstances in which the promisee has better information about the promisor’s likelihood of
performance—such as when the promisee can aggregate information across numerous similarly situated promisors
and the promisor does not have access to this information. Yet exceptions of this sort should be rare.
140
For both trust-building and status-enhancing gratuitous promises, the promisee and the outside society are more
likely to respect promises viewed as reliable over promises viewed as likely to result in default. Being perceived as
reliable results in an immediate benefit, as the promisors can gain more trust or status for the same cost. The picture
is more complicated for altruistic promisors, but even these promisors care about their perceived reliability to the
extent they wish their promisees to engage in beneficial reliance – which is the primary purpose for making an
altruistic promise to deliver a future benefit, rather than merely conveying that benefit at the future date.
141
It is also worth noting another assumption underlying our analysis – that promisors will not signal through other
means when prevented from making their promises legally binding. As Aghion and Hermalin write, supra note 133,
at 404, it remains uncertain “whether restricting only a subset of signals can improve efficiency.” If promisors
responded to the lack of a legally binding option by hiring the mob to enforce their promises, this outcome would
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B. A Conceptual Explanation of Inefficient Signaling Spirals
As a consequence of asymmetric information, promisors may be more or less reliable
than they are perceived to be. Promisors whose actual reliability exceeds their perceived
reliability may seek means for convincing promisees of their greater-than-average likelihood of
performance. Given the option of having their promises legally enforced, these promisees might
agree to bind themselves.142 There are costs to entering a legally binding form. The world is
unpredictable and no promisor can be completely certain that she will still wish to fulfill her
promise at the appropriate future date. Securing a promise as a binding contract forces the
promisor to bear costs in the event that she is unable—or unwilling—to perform. Nevertheless,
the contractual form may still be attractive when the benefit from increasing perceived reliability
exceeds the cost of potentially paying legal damages.
Following this logic, the conventional accounts claim that parties should be allowed to
legally bind themselves because promisors will only exercise this option if the benefits of doing
so exceed the costs. Thus conceived, the existence of a legally binding form does not influence a
promisor’s wishes—it merely effectuates them. But what this account ignores is that creating a
legally binding form can diminish the perceived reliability of promises that are not made
pursuant to that form.
Imagine a group of promisors with an average probability of performance of 80%. Some
promisors will have a higher likelihood of performance, and others will have a lower one, but
promisees, unable to distinguish relatively reliable promisors from unreliable ones, will view any
member of the group as having an expected likelihood of performance of 80%. Now imagine
that some of these promisors secure their promises as legally binding contracts while others do
not. All else being equal, the promisors who take advantage of the legally binding option should
have a lower-than-average chance of default. This is because promisors with a relatively low
probability of default can enter a legally binding form with far lest cost, as there is less chance
that they will end up being subject to legal sanctions. Once the most-reliable promisors choose
to bind themselves, the remaining pool of (non-bound) promisors will be viewed as having an
increased average likelihood of default. In other words, allowing relatively reliable promisors to
clearly be worse than the inefficient signaling spirals created by legal enforcement. Promisors might conceivably
engage in a variety of costly behaviors designed to signal their reliability.
Yet making a promise legally binding is an exceptionally strong signal. To a large extent, the prospect of
paying expectation damages effectively raises a promisor’s reliability to 100%. Factoring in litigation costs lowers
the promisees eventual recovery, but also provides an additional deterrent to promisors. Only alternatives like mob
enforcement are likely to have anywhere near this strength, and we doubt that more than a tiny fraction of promisors
will employ alternatives of this sort. As such, we feel reasonably comfortable modeling promisors as lacking
alternative signals.
Moreover, looking ahead, promisors who are willing to use extreme alternative forms of signaling are
unlikely to avoid articulating consideration merely on account of anti-commodification norms. As we discuss in
Part IV.C.1, infra, the consideration doctrine makes a legally binding option available for promisors who care
sufficiently about securing their promises to ignore any taboos against the use of bargain-form language. The set of
promisors who will be deterred by anti-commodification norms despite being willing to employ costly alternatives
to legal enforcement, is likely to be sufficiently small so as to not be worth noticing.
142
This result corresponds with Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEG.
STUD. 401 (1991). Yet Shavell’s model only include two types of promisors—sincere promisors and masqueraders
who have no intention of performing. As such, Shavell’s conclusions are directly opposite to ours. We owe Shavell
a debt of gratitude for inspiring our own analysis, but his model is ultimately flawed do to its failure to recognize
that even sincere promisors can differ with respect to their probability of performance.
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differentiate themselves from the general group will lead promisees to assign a reduced
likelihood of performance to any promisors who refuse to employ the legally binding form.

Figure 1. The Signaling Spiral
Not Bound

Step 1: No promisors
are bound

Bound

All
Average likelihood of
performance: 80%

Step 2: Promisors with
>80%
likelihood
of
performance choose to
bind themselves

>80%
<80%

Remaining avg.: 70%

Step 3: Promisors with
70-80% likelihood of
performance choose to
bind themselves

Step 4: Promisors with
60-70% likelihood of
performance choose to
bind themselves

70-80%
<70%
>80%
Remaining avg.: 60%

<50%

60-70%
>70%

Remaining avg.: 40%

This process can create a harmful spiral. If promisors with a 90% chance of performance
sign contracts in order to differentiate themselves from a group with an average performance rate
of 80%, the remaining members of the group might be seen as having only a 70% chance of
performance (the average probability of the now-smaller group). This reduced assessment of
reliability might then cause the promisors with an 80% chance of performance to sign contracts
in order to differentiate themselves from the new group average of 70%, thereby further reducing
the assessed reliability of the remaining members of the group. Continuing the pattern,
promisors with a 70% chance of performance might sign contracts in order to differentiate
themselves from the new 60% average, and so on. Figure 1 depicts this process pictorially.
In this fashion, promisors can essentially be forced into adopting a legally binding form.
Even when many, or even most, of the promisors would prefer for there not to be a legally
binding option, once that option exists the promisors may feel obliged to exercise it.
Consequently, promisors may well prefer not to have the option to bind themselves.
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As Ian Ayres describes the inefficient signaling phenomenon, the “inefficiency of
signaling stems not only from the efforts of [reliable promisors] to signal but also from the
efforts of [unreliable promisors] to falsely match those signals which cause the [reliable
promisors] to run even further away from the efficient contracting point.”143 Ayres continues by
analogizing inefficient signaling to Dr. Seuss’s parable about the Sneetches:
High-status Sneetches had stars on their bellies and low-status Sneetches did not. As the tale
unfolds, vast inefficiencies are generated as the low-status Sneetches try to match the highstatus ones by affixing stars to their bellies and the high-status Sneetches try to further
distinguish themselves by then removing their stars. The moral of the story is that finding
credible signals may be extremely hard and that the mere attempt to distinguish yourself
whether or not it succeeds can generate social inefficiencies.144

In addition to harming promisors, the creation of a legally binding form can also harm
promisees. Promisors should only make promises when their benefit from doing so exceeds their
costs. Regardless of whether a promisor seeks something of material value in exchange for a
promise, seeks increased trust or status, or seeks to altruistically enhance the welfare of a
promisee, the promisor will only bind herself when doing so can be expected to result in her
obtaining enough additional benefit from promising to compensate for the costs of potentially
paying sanctions if she ultimately needs to default. In the absence of signaling motivations,
promisors should size their promises so as to maximize their expected benefit from promising
while minimizing their costs.
By reducing the perceived reliability of promisors who choose not to bind themselves,
signaling spirals force promisors to either reduce their expected benefits or else increase their
expected costs. If the promisors refuse to bind themselves, they will receive less benefit from
promising on account of their lower perceived reliability. But if the promisors do choose to bind
themselves, they will thereby increase their costs due to the possibility of needing to bear legal
sanctions. In either case, signaling spirals can make promising less attractive to promisors.
Some promisors will decide that this less attractive value proposition no longer justifies
promising. When the benefits of promising are reduced, the benefits may no longer exceed the
costs, causing some promisors to leave the promising game altogether. Other promisors will
reduce the size of their promises, so as to lower their potential costs if they end up needing to pay
damages. Through a combination of these reactions, signaling spirals can reduce the overall
value of what promisors offer to promisees. In this manner, signaling spirals can harm
promisees as well as promisors.
This Part has attempted to provide a conceptual overview of the logic behind signaling
spirals. Again, we prove these results through formal models in the appendices. But it is
important to realize that not all signaling spirals are inefficient. The goal of this Part was to
demonstrate that allowing promisors to bind themselves does not necessarily benefit either
promisors or promisees. In some instances, even parties who choose to make their promises
legally obligating would prefer not having the option to do so. But in other circumstances, the
benefits of allowing promisors to back their promises through law should exceed the costs.
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Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 400 (1991). Ayres is
discussing corporate charters rather than contract formation, but his description of the Aghion-Hermalin model for
inefficient signaling remains valid.
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Without further analysis, we cannot distinguish the circumstances where parties would
benefit from having a legally binding option from the circumstances where providing this option
would be harmful. All we can know is that the mere fact that parties take advantage of a legally
obligating form does not mean that they benefit from the existence of that form. The traditional
assumption that parties expressed intentions necessarily reflect their true desires is flawed. There
is a difference between one’s actions when confronted with a legal rule and one’s preferences for
what the legal rule should be.
IV. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE
We have now demonstrated the flaws in two assumptions underlying traditional accounts
of the consideration doctrine: First, not all parties who might wish to do so can back their
promises with nominal consideration. Second, the mere fact that parties utilize an option for
making their promises legally binding does not imply that they desire the existence of this
option. Part III argued that parties’ expressed intentions do not necessarily conform to their
underlying desires. Yet if we cannot look to parties’ expressed intentions for determining
whether they want to be bound, to what can we look? Must we abandon any hope that contract
law might honor parties’ wishes?
Our new account of the consideration doctrine synthesizes the analysis from the previous
two Parts. On a general level, we advocate using nominal consideration as a mechanism for
determining when bargaining is limited by anti-commodification norms. Although the dividing
lines are blurry, anti-commodification norms separate a market-oriented sphere of interactions in
which parties can bargain over their promises from a relationship-oriented sphere in which
parties face severe limitations on their ability to bargain. We argue that the law should only
enforce promises made within the market-oriented sphere. When anti-commodification norms
prevent parties from bargaining, the law should not allow these parties to bind themselves.
Our account is in some respects similar to the substantive theories discussed in Part I.
Yet where substantive theorists have called on courts to strike down promises backed only by
nominal consideration, we would enforce these promises. The reason substantive theorists wish
to deny enforcement to promises backed only by nominal consideration is to prevent gratuitous
promisors from binding themselves by dressing their promises in bargain-form language. But as
we have shown, nominal consideration will generally be unavailable to promisors operating
wholly within the non-market sphere. To the extent that substantive theorists seek only to block
enforcement of promises made within the relationship-oriented sphere, they need not oppose the
enforcement of promises backed by nominal consideration.
As we argued in Part I, substantive accounts are mistaken in their belief that
consideration-backed promises are inherently more deserving of legal support. So why then do
we favor denying enforcement to promises that lack even nominal consideration? Our answer is
formalist in nature. We justify nominal consideration as the best mechanism for determining
which promises parties actually desire to make binding.
Our game theory analysis described in Part III relied on the assumption that promises and
contracts contained only two terms. Yet this assumption does not hold for promises made within
the market-oriented sphere. When parties are able to bargain—where anti-commodification
norms do not apply—they are also able to design contracts using more than two terms. In
addition to the terms previously discussed—the size of the promise and the level of sanctions—
these parties should also be able to specify their promises’ scope and level of return payments.
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We will define both of these terms later in this Part.145 In brief, the “scope” of a promise refers
to the circumstances under which a promisor’s performance will be excused. And “return
payments” refers to what a promisee gives in exchange for a promise—in other words, the
consideration.
Crucially, our analysis from Part III does not apply when parties can negotiate over a
promise’s scope and return payments. When parties are able to overcome anti-commodification
norms and dress their promises as bargains, we can generally conclude that the parties would
benefit from having their promises legally enforced. For promises made within the marketoriented sphere, the fact that parties choose to use a legally binding form generally does indicate
that they desire the existence of this form.
Our account thus seeks to distinguish between the market- and relationship-oriented
spheres, not for substantive reasons, but for formalist purposes. Only within the market-oriented
sphere can a form like nominal consideration provide parties with an effective mechanism for
communicating when they truly wish to be bound.
To complete our argument, we turn last to promises made wholly within the relationshiporiented sphere—promises for which anti-commodification norms prevent the parties from using
even a pretense of the bargain form. For these promises, legal formalisms cannot adequately
determine the parties’ actual desires. Unlike market-oriented promisors, relationship-oriented
promisors cannot negotiate over a promise’s scope or its level of return payments. With only
two terms available for characterizing their promises, these parties are subject to the inefficient
signaling spirals described in Part III. When parties are unable to bargain, any mechanism we
might give them to legally bind themselves could end up enforcing promises that the parties
would prefer to leave non-binding.
Moreover, a number of tie-breaking factors further support our position of not enforcing
promises where anti-commodification norms block the use of nominal consideration: These
promises are administratively costly to enforce. And, to the extent that we believe the
philosophical arguments against commodification, enforcing these promises might advance the
forces of market imperialism, damaging non-market values and relationships. Perhaps most
importantly, relationship-oriented promises are made within a complicated web of personal
interactions and interlocking obligations. Due to the same anti-commodification norms that
make bargaining impossible, many of the parameters of these relationships are unstated.
Enforcing these promises might cause injustice to the parties by making some commitments
legally obligating while other, unstated, return commitments remained outside the legal domain.
Combined with our inability to know whether parties actually desire non-market promises to be
enforced, these tie-breaking factors call strongly against providing legal support for promises not
backed by even nominal consideration.
To summarize, unlike the substantive accounts that seek to deny enforcement to
gratuitous promises, we value the consideration doctrine for its potential to identify the
circumstances in which bargain-form language is socially permissible. Only when parties can
bargain without violating anti-commodification norms do we accept the formalist position that
the law should honor parties’ intensions as expressed at the time of contract formation. For only
within this market-oriented sphere can we conclude that parties who utilize a form like nominal
consideration actually desire to make their promises binding.
145

III.B.
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A. Relaxing the Assumption that Promises Have Only Two Terms
The consideration doctrine creates an option for the legal enforcement of promises in
contexts where parties can voice consideration and denies this option where norms block the use
of consideration. The doctrine must thus be justified against two potential alternatives—denying
enforcement to a larger set of promises and permitting a larger set of promises to be enforced.
This section argues in favor of allowing parties to make certain gratuitous promises enforceable
against the alternative of denying enforcement to all gratuitous promises. In other words, the
section argues for enforcing promises backed only by nominal consideration as opposed to
requiring substantial consideration or an even more-restrictive legal form. The next two sections
complete the analysis by arguing against enforcing promises where parties cannot voice even
nominal consideration.
When describing inefficient signaling spirals in Part III, we assumed that promises
consisted of only two terms—the level of sanctions and the size of the promise. Inefficient
signaling occurred when the promisors attempted to signal their reliability by making their
promises legally binding (by increasing their level of sanctions). Since increasing the level of
sanctions raises the costs to promisors of making a promise, these costs must be offset by
adjustments made to the other contracting terms. Under our previous assumption of only two
terms, promisors decreased the size of their promises whenever signaling caused them to make
their promises legally binding. These reductions in the size of promises diminished welfare, as
they caused promisors to depart from their optimal bundle of terms for signaling purposes.
If we relax the assumption of only two contracting terms, promisors can adjust more than
just the size of a promise when compensating for raising the level of sanctions. In addition to the
size of a promise and the level of sanctions, promises may consist of two other terms—the
promise’s scope and its level of return payments.
Scope relates to the conditions under which performance will occur. A promisor might
qualify his promise by listing the circumstances that will lead to non-performance—for example,
“I promise to take you to Disneyland, unless I lose my job, the Red Sox make the playoffs, or a
relative dies.” By narrowing the scope of a promise, promisors reduce the costs to themselves of
making the promise and the value the promise confers on the promisees. In the event that a
scope-reducing event takes place, the promisor need neither fulfill the promise nor be subject to
sanctions. In contrast, a reduction in the size of a promise might entail taking the promisee to a
local amusement park instead of to Disneyland. Size adjustments affect the value of what is
delivered under all circumstances, while scope adjustments affect the conditions under which the
promise must be carried out.
“Return payments” is our term for anything offered by the promisee in order to induce
the promise—in other words, the consideration. For promises made as part of a market
exchange, the promisor’s desire for return payments forms their primary motivation for entering
into the promise. Without return payments, exchange-oriented promises would not take place.
Although gratuitous promisors are primarily motivated by something other than the desire for
return payments, they may still value return payments.
For the purposes of this section, we evaluate return payments as a promise term rather
than as a mechanism for inducing promisors to make a promise. As a promise term, return
payments can be adjusted in order to trade off with the other terms. If the parties wish to raise
the level of sanctions without reducing the size of the promise, they can instead raise the level of
return payments. Consequently, as we use the term, return payments must be different in nature
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from what the promisor offers the promisee. If a promisor is offering to give the promisee a
hundred dollars at a future date, a return payment cannot consist of the promisee giving ten
dollars back at the same date. In this case, offering the return payment would be equivalent to
reducing the size of the promise by ten dollars. In contrast, a promisee’s offer to deliver ten
dollars now as partial consideration for a future promise of a hundred dollars could constitute a
return payment. The key difference between these scenarios is that the parties might have
different preferences for how they value money now as opposed to money at the future date.
Return payments must be different in nature from the promised goods or services; the parties
must have different preferences for tradeoffs between the return payments and the size of the
promise. If the parties have the same preferences for tradeoffs between the return payments and
the promised goods or services, adjustments to return payments would be equivalent to adjusting
the size of the promise. Only when return payments are different in nature from the promised
goods or services can they function as a separate term.
Our argument that parties who can invoke nominal consideration are not subject to
inefficient signaling spirals is based on two claims. First, the potential for offering return
payments and scope adjustments alleviates the harm from this type of signaling. Second, there is
a substantial overlap between the contexts in which parties can articulate consideration and the
contexts in which parties can make return payments and scope adjustments. Where anticommodification norms prevent the use of consideration, the same norms will usually block
parties from making return payments or scope adjustments. As such, signaling spirals will
typically only be costly when consideration is unavailable.
1. The Effects of Multiple Terms
In the absence of signaling considerations, promisors should size their promises so as to
minimize their costs while maximizing the value conferred on their promisees. The promisors
should likewise select a level of sanctions that minimizes their costs while maximizing value to
their promisees. Promisors only depart from this optimal bundle of terms in order to signal their
reliability. When signaling leads promisors to raise their level of sanctions above the optimal
level (by making their promises legally binding), the promisors must compensate by adjusting
the other terms of their promise so that their costs do not exceed the benefit they receive from
promising.
Under our previous assumption of only two terms, signaling-based increases in the level
of sanctions forced promisors to reduce the size of their promises. These departures from the
promises’ optimal sizes create harms for both promisors and promisees.
In most promises, transferring the promised goods or services increases value for the
promisee more than it decreases value for the promisor. This result is most clear for exchangeoriented promises. Exchange-oriented promisors should only offer their promised goods or
services if they value them less than what the promisees offer in return. Similarly, the promisees
should only accept a promise if they value what is promised above what they give up in
exchange for the promise. That promisees and promisors have different value functions is what
makes exchanges welfare-enhancing. This value-creating function of market exchanges lies at
the heart of economic theory.
Altruistic promises present a more complicated picture. Nevertheless, promisors should
only promise if they prefer the promisee to have the promised goods or services rather than
maintaining possession themselves. When we combine the value promisors receive from
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interdependent utility with the value promisees gain from receiving the promise, altruistic
promises create value just as market exchanges do.146
For both altruistic and exchange-oriented promises, transferring the promised goods or
services creates value for society. Whether the same result holds true for trust-building and
status-enhancing promises is unclear, as we will discuss further in the next section. However, as
we explained previously, promisors making trust-building and status-enhancing promises will
often be unable to articulate consideration.147 This section argues for enforcing gratuitous
promises where parties can voice consideration against the alternative of not enforcing any
gratuitous promises. As such, for the purposes of this section, we can ignore trust-building and
status-enhancing promises. The majority of promises for which consideration is socially
available will be dominated by altruistic or exchange-oriented motives. For ritualized or
signaling-based promises, the transfer of goods or services plays a secondary role to the
messages the promises convey. In contrast, altruistic and exchange-oriented promises are
primarily concerned with the actual transfer of the goods or services. For these promises, the
transfer of goods or services from the promisor to the promisee creates value.
The opposite relationship holds for return payments. At a minimum, we have no reason
to think that promisees value the goods or services offered as return payments more than
promisors do. If money is used as a return payment, for example, we might assume that the
parties value the money equally. Consider a promisor who offers to drive a promisee to the
airport. If the promise were made legally enforceable, the promisor might need to reduce the
size of the promise in order to compensate for the costs of entering the legally binding form.
Perhaps the promisor would offer to drive the promisee only to the nearest bus station, forcing
the promisee to take the bus the rest of the way to the airport. Since the promisor would have
been willing to drive the promisee all the way to the airport in the absence of sanctions, we can
assume it costs less for the promisor to drive the promisee to the airport than it does for the
promisee to take the bus. Hence, if return payments were available, the promisee might offer ten
dollars in exchange for the promisor’s driving her all the way to the airport. If the parties can
agree on a return payment that can induce the promisor to maintain the original size of her
promise (a ride all the way to the airport) despite the costs of entering the legally binding form,
this new outcome will be a Pareto improvement over the alternative—a reduction in the size of
the promise (a ride only to the bus station). The promisee should value being driven all the way
to the airport more than the money given as a return payment, and the promisor should value the
return payment above the costs of the additional driving.
Moreover, this example actually understates our argument. When something other than
money is used as a return payment, there is every reason to think promisees will offer something
that the promisors value more than they do. Rational promisees should offer whatever return
payment they have available that maximizes the benefit conferred on promisors at the minimum
cost to the promisee. In the airport example, the promisee might offer to watch the promisor’s
kids, to give the promisor guitar lessons, or to provide some other good or service that the
promisee can offer at below-market costs. Consequently, signaling through the use of return
payments does not create the same harms as signaling through reductions in the size of a
promise.
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Signaling through scope adjustments also avoids the harms from reducing a promise’s
size. The conclusions in Part III relied on the assumption of asymmetric information. Promisors
only engage in inefficient signaling when they cannot directly communicate their probability of
performance to promisees. Under conditions of symmetric information, there are no incentives
for inefficient signaling, and promisors should offer welfare-maximizing combinations of terms.
Promisors only depart from the welfare-maximizing bundle of terms in order to signal their
reliability.
By making scope adjustments, promisors can directly communicate information about
their probability of performance. This communication is not perfect, and excessive use of scope
adjustments can lead to inefficiencies. But scope adjustments still avoid the harms associated
with reducing a promise’s size.
The reason promisors cannot directly communicate information about their reliability
without scope adjustments is that unreliable promisors face incentives to mimic what is said by
reliable promisors. Scope adjustments specify conditions under which a promise will not be
performed. When reliable promisors make scope adjustments in order to compensate for
increasing their level of sanctions, they explain circumstances that would cause them to renege
on the promise. Facing incentives to mimic the statements of reliable promisors, unreliable
promisors may make similar scope adjustments.
Still, unreliable promisors should not need to specify the same exact conditions for nonperformance as reliable promisors. Multiple reliable promisors may differ in the exact
circumstances under which they would be unable to perform. Reliability is an aggregate
characteristic. Two promisors are equally reliable when the sum of their probabilities of nonperformance due to various conditions is the same; the exact composition of the individual nonperformance conditions need not be identical. Unreliable promisors should thus only need to
mimic reliable promisors with regard to their aggregate probability of non-performance. They
can specify non-performance conditions freely as long as they do not exceed the aggregate
probability expressed by reliable promisors. Since unreliable promisors may mimic the
aggregate reliability conveyed by reliable promisors, scope adjustments cannot create symmetric
information. Promisors still cannot directly convey their probability of performance. Yet the
key point remains that scope adjustments communicate some information about nonperformance conditions.
Promisees benefit from knowing the composition of promisors’ non-performance
conditions even when they do not know whether the specified conditions are the only
circumstances under which the promisor will not perform or the aggregate probability of
performance. Knowing some of the conditions under which a promisor might renege can help
the promisee to take precautions against default. The probability associated with each condition
may not remain constant over time. If a promise is to be fulfilled two years after it was formed,
the promisee may wish to reevaluate the probability of performance at the end of year one. To
the extent the promisee knows some of the conditions under which non-performance is likely to
occur, she can better estimate the new aggregate likelihood of breach. If a promisor specifies a
non-performance condition that she will not drive the promisor to the airport if there is ice on the
road, the promisee can check the weather forecast the day before and thereby determine whether
she needs to order a cab. Reassessments of this sort made after the time of promising do not
affect promisor welfare. But the promisees can benefit from being able to better decide the
degree to which the promise should be relied on. Overall welfare increases to the extent
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promisees can avoid relying too much or too little. Specification of scope conditions helps
promisees rely optimally.
The overall effects of signaling-based scope adjustments depend on the reason the
promisors failed to specify these scope conditions prior to signaling. One possibility is that, with
sanctions low, the promisors preferred not to reveal information that might cause the promisees
to lower their assessments of the promisors’ reliability. All else being equal, a promisee might
assign a lower probability of performance to promisors specifying scope conditions than to
promisors who do not specify these conditions. After all, specifying a scope condition involves
admitting at least one potential circumstance under which the promisor will not perform. But
once signaling forces these promisors to make their promise legally binding, the prospect of
facing legal sanctions in the event of breach may overwhelm their concern about worsening the
perception of their reliability in the eyes of the promisees.
To the extent this forms the reason that promisors fail to specify scope conditions in the
absence of signaling, signaling-based scope adjustments clearly increase welfare. Specifying the
scope conditions does not decrease the magnitude of what the promisor actually intends to
deliver, but only involves the promisor conveying information about the circumstances under
which she is likely to breach. This conveyance of information to the promisees helps them rely
optimally and thereby improves welfare.
However, promisors might face costs in analyzing their non-performance conditions. At
some level, evaluating all of the circumstances under which the promisor would need to breach
might not be cost effective. Or signaling might cause promisors to specify scope conditions for
circumstances where they might have actually performed in the absence of signaling concerns.
Hence, the potential for scope adjustments might not completely alleviate the potential harms
from signaling spirals. But, at a minimum, scope adjustments should greatly minimize these
harms. And if signaling causes promisors to make value-enhancing scope specifications that
they would otherwise have been unwilling to reveal, these scope adjustments might even make
the signaling spirals efficient. Whereas size adjustments reduce the potential gains from trade,
scope adjustments provide information that can improve promisee welfare.
Together, the potential for return payments and scope adjustments should alleviate most
of the harms from inefficient signaling, and may even cause this signaling to be efficient. Where
size adjustments reduce overall welfare, return payments and scope adjustments may enhance
welfare. At the very least, adjusting these terms should not create anywhere near as much harm
as size reductions create.148
Once we relax the assumption of only two terms, signaling spirals no longer present a
significant cause for concern. When return payments and scope adjustments are available, we
can return to the standard assumption that parties benefit when the law enforces their mutually
agreed upon statements made at the time of contract formation. Promisors should only make
promises when they benefit from doing so, and promisees should only accept the promises when
they likewise benefit. Promises made with multiple terms enhance social welfare by transferring
148

Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that promisors face increasing marginal costs from making adjustments
to any one term. Even if return payments and scope adjustments were just as harmful as size adjustments, the ability
to adjust these terms might still mitigate some of the harm from inefficient signaling. To the extent adjusting terms
produces increasing marginal costs, more welfare is lost from a second reduction to the size of a promise than from a
first adjustment of equivalent magnitude, with even more welfare lost by a third adjustment. If the promisors can
split their adjustments across multiple terms, instead of adjusting only the size of the promise, less welfare may be
lost even when equivalently sized adjustments to any one of the terms would be equally costly.
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the promised goods or services to the parties who value them the most or who have the greatest
need for them, while permitting promisees to rely adequately on the promisor’s ultimate
performance.
2. The Availability of Multiple Terms
Having satisfied ourselves that the potential for multiple terms alleviates the harm from
signaling spirals, we need to determine the circumstances under which promises can be
characterized by multiple terms. Our answer is simple: Multiple terms will generally be
available in the same contexts in which parties can invoke consideration. When anticommodification norms prevent parties from articulating consideration, these norms will often
obstruct return payments and scope adjustments as well.
The reasons for this are readily apparent in the case of return payments. Consideration is
a form of return payment. When a promisee offers consideration in exchange for a promise, she
is by definition offering a return payment. The consideration doctrine can only be activated
when the parties claim that a promise is being given in exchange for a return
payment/consideration. When social norms permit parties to explicitly discuss return payments,
they should also allow the parties to use return payments as a term of the promise. The act of
bargaining entails a discussion of the amount of consideration, which effectively makes the level
of return payments a term of the promise.
Nevertheless, we might imagine circumstances in which return payments are available
but consideration is not. In order to invoke the consideration doctrine, the parties must explicitly
acknowledge the consideration/return payment. If the parties were permitted to make return
payments, but not to explicitly acknowledge these return payments, the consideration doctrine
would still be unavailable.
Yet using return payments as a term of a promise requires communication between the
promisor and promisee. The promisee must offer the return payments in exchange for the
promisor maintaining the size of the promise. It is hard to imagine communications of this sort
taking place in contexts in which consideration is unavailable. Where parties can negotiate
explicitly, they should be able to discuss tradeoffs between return payments and the size of the
promise. Where the parties cannot negotiate explicitly—where consideration is unavailable—the
parties will often find it impossible to negotiate over the level of return payments as a term of the
promise.
A similar logic applies to scope adjustments. The reason consideration is often
unavailable is that cost-benefit language can commodify a promise. As Jane Baron writes,
“economic transfers call for detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit terms
which are inappropriate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts.”149 Expressing a long list of
conditions under which a promise will not be performed is the epitome of cost-benefit language.
Consider our previous discussion of the economic logic behind trust-building
promises.150 In some relationships, courts are unable to effectively monitor whether the parties
cooperate in the manner required by the relationship. In place of legal sanctions, the parties rely
on mutual trust. The use of consideration and cost-benefit language in trust-building promises
violates the spirit of the relationship. Promisors are expected to fulfill promises to the best of
149
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their ability, and promisees are expected to understand if circumstances arise that make the
promisor unable to perform.151 Perhaps promisors can permissibly inform promisees if there are
particularly noteworthy circumstances under which performance would be impossible. But
attempts to negotiate tradeoffs between scope conditions and the size of the promise, or
indications that the promisor is trading off between these terms, suggest a cost-benefit mentality
inappropriate for trust-building purposes.
Looking back to our discussion of anti-commodification norms in philosophy and
political theory, the explicit specification of duties within intimate relationships was thought to
corrupt the meaning of those relationships.152 Evaluating in advance whether performance is
cost effective under myriad circumstances implies that a relationship is valued as a means rather
than as an end. Specifying scope conditions signals that the value of the relationship is finite and
definable, that the costs of maintaining the relationship can be traded off against other potential
uses for the resources invested in the relationship. In circumstances where anti-commodification
norms block the use of consideration, the norms are likely to prevent the use of scope
adjustments as well.
As anthropologists and sociologists have explained, even thinking about noncommodifiable relationships in cost-benefit terms can seem inappropriate.153 Yet specifying
scope conditions requires the promisor to evaluate the predicted costs of performance under
various circumstances and to weigh these costs against the benefit to be obtained from making
the promise—or from making the promise a certain size. When norms block the use of costbenefit thinking and language, parties will often lack the capacity to engage in this sort of
reasoning.
We do not mean to overstate our case. We do not claim that there is a perfect
relationship between social contexts in which consideration is unavailable and contexts in which
norms prevent return payments and scope adjustments. Social norms are intricately complex and
circumstance dependent. Any attempt to describe the content of norms at a general level is likely
to be oversimplified. Yet we have reason to expect a substantial overlap between the
circumstances in which consideration is unavailable and the circumstances in which parties
cannot make return payments or scope adjustments. Consideration is a form of return payment;
scope adjustments can only be made using a cost-benefit mentality that anti-commodification
norms are designed to block. When parties are able to articulate consideration, there is every
reason to believe they will also be able to negotiate return payments and scope adjustments.
When social norms block parties from voicing consideration, these norms will typically prevent
return payments and scope adjustments as well.
As such, any harms caused by signaling spirals will tend to be minimal under
circumstances where consideration is socially available. The consideration doctrine divides
promisor-promisee relationships into a first category in which voicing consideration is possible
and the parties are likely to be able to make return payments and scope adjustments, and a
second category in which social norms prevent the articulation of consideration and likely
obstruct the use of return payments and scope adjustments as well. A legally binding option is
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only granted for the first category, the category of circumstances in which inefficient signaling
spirals are unlikely to occur.
B. Circumstances in which Consideration Is Unavailable
When contracting parties are able to voice consideration, they should typically be able to
make scope adjustments and return payments, thus alleviating the potential harm from signaling
spirals. But what about promises for which norms block the use of consideration—promises for
which inefficient signaling can pose a significant cause for concern?
The models described in Part III show that allowing a legally binding option for these
promises can harm both promisors and promisees. But the models do not show whether, on
balance, allowing legal enforcement actually does harm the promisors and promisees. The
models conclude only that the welfare effects of a legally binding option are uncertain, that we
cannot simply assume that parties desire the existence of this option based on their exercising the
option.
Whether an option for legal enforcement of promises enhances or diminishes welfare
depends on a variety of factors, including: the promisors’ probabilities of performance, the
potential benefits from increasing promisee reliance, and the magnitude of the costs promisors
bear when faced with legal sanctions. We might question whether enforcing promises would
either be generally welfare enhancing or welfare diminishing within the likely specifications for
these factors. But how can we know what specifications are reasonable?
Aghion and Hermalin conclude that “the question of whether a given set of restrictions
improves or reduces efficiency is an empirical one: only by considering variations in these
restrictions over time, across states, or across nations can one truly determine the effects of these
restrictions on efficiency.”154 Empirical analysis might shed some light on our question.
Perhaps empirical studies could show that the effects of inefficient signaling are muted for
certain types of promises, or conversely, that the likely harms from inefficient signaling are
particularly severe for select groups of promises. But we doubt that empirical studies are capable
of determining the effects of making a legally binding option available for the entire range of
non-commodifiable promises.
Signaling spirals only occur among groups of promisors with similar observable
characteristics. When a legally binding option is offered to a group of promisors, this should not
affect promisors with different observable characteristics—promisors who are not part of the
same reference group. For example, if Gina promises to give Fred a car at a future date, Fred
will probably try to assess Gina’s probability of performance by looking to whether promisors
similar to Gina fulfilled promises of a similar nature in the past. If Gina is an elderly social
worker, and Barbara is a young shopkeeper, Fred probably will not assess the likelihood of Gina
actually delivering the car by examining whether Barbara previously fulfilled a promise to sell
bubblegum for a dollar. Both the promisors and the promises are sufficiently dissimilar in these
two scenarios that they are unlikely to be part of the same reference group.155
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As such, a necessary first step to performing any empirical analysis requires determining
which promises are in the same reference group. This assessment is by no means trivial.
Individual promisors may fall within multiple reference groups for different types of promises,
creating an interlocking web of reference groups. And promisees may differ about what
observable characteristics they find most salient. For instance, a racist promisee might not
consider promises made by the members of a minority group as comparable to promises made by
the majority, while a non-racist promisee would lump promisors into reference groups without
looking at the color of their skin. Any promisor can be viewed as having an infinite number of
observable characteristics, yet promisees will only take some of these characteristics into account
when making judgments about which promisors are comparable.156 A meaningful empirical
analysis would have to sort through this convoluted and constantly-shifting web of reference
groups in order to evaluate the magnitude of signaling costs.
In the absence of convincing empirical studies, we need a default determination about
whether to provide a legally binding option for non-commodifiable promises. We must look
beyond the models in order to decide which default determination is more appropriate—either
denying enforcement to promises unbacked by consideration or allowing all promises to be
enforced.
C. Tie-Breaking Factors
The standard assumption that the law should enforce parties’ expressed intentions relies
on the notion that these expressed intentions represent the parties’ underlying desires. But for
non-commodifiable promises, signaling spirals can lead promisors to enter a legally binding
form even when they would prefer that the form not exist. Lacking means for determining
parties’ true desires, we look to a number of tie-breaking factors that support a default rule of
non-enforcement. None of these factors are particularly persuasive, at least to the extent we have
developed them here; we do not claim any of the factors would justify ignoring parties’ wishes if
we could confidently ascertain those wishes. But in the absence of a better guide for policy,
these factors support a default rule of denying enforcement to promises unbacked by
consideration.
For our first tie-breaking factor, we cite the administrative costs of enforcement.
Enforcing promises through the legal system creates numerous costs. Someone must pay for the
judge’s salary and the salaries of the other court employees. And lawyers typically take a
significant portion of the eventual judgment or settlement. Even the time the parties invest in
litigating a dispute can represent significant costs. These costs warn against legal overreaching.

expectation about Gina’s likelihood of performance must arise from somewhere. If Fred has witnessed promisors
similar to Gina reneging on their promises in the past, he is more likely to doubt Gina’s probability of performance.
Signaling spirals do not take place immediately. But over time, removing some of the members from a reference
group is likely to alter promisees’ expectations about the remaining members of the group.
156
We continue to assume that promisors have limited control over their observable characteristics. Or, at a
minimum, that any efforts by promisors to adjust their observable characteristics for signaling purposes when
consideration is not available do not create significant welfare costs. To the extent promisors invest in being viewed
as responsible, these efforts might be welfare enhancing. The set of behaviors likely to signal that one is a reliable
promisor are generally viewed as socially desirable – avoiding lying, displaying generosity, and so on. See note 139
supra for a related discussion.
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When we are truly uncertain about whether the law could effectively monitor a social dispute,
administrative costs form a tie-breaker justifying legal restraint.157
As a second tie-breaking factor, we note that non-commodifiable promises operate within
a web of complex obligations. The fact that parties cannot voice consideration for these
promises suggests that there may be other mutually understood obligations that are never
explicitly stated in a form that courts can identify.158 To enforce only the explicitly promised
obligations would risk imposing an undue burden on the promisor, as her explicitly articulated
obligations would become enforceable but any unarticulated return obligations of the promisee
would remained unenforced.
Third, even ignoring the potential harm from inefficient signaling, the welfare
consequences of non-commodifiable promises may be ambiguous. Eric Posner has discussed at
length why status-enhancing and trust-building promises are not necessarily welfare
enhancing.159 The reason is that these promises are positional in nature. When one promisor
gains status, others lose status. And when promisors use gifts to gain a promisee’s trust, these
gifts can raise the costs to everyone else of gaining trust. The use of promises to gain trust or
status can result in a prisoners’ dilemma problem. Promisors may find themselves giving gifts
merely to retain their relative position, such that they would be better off if everyone abstained
from making status-enhancing and trust-building promises.160
Almost by definition, the message sent by non-commodifiable promises is more
important than the actual transfer of goods or services. We assume that the transfer of goods or
services from altruistic and exchange-oriented promises enhances welfare because otherwise
these promises would not be made. Promisors make exchange-oriented promises in order to gain
something of value from the promisees—something that they prefer more than the goods or
services they give up. And promisors make altruistic promises because they want the promisees
to have the promised goods or services. But we have no reason for assuming that the actual
transfer of goods or services enhances welfare in non-commodifiable promises. Consequently, it
is hard to generalize about whether these transfers enhance or diminish welfare. When the
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potential costs from signaling spirals are factored in, we might presume that enforcing these
promises would generally reduce welfare.161
On a related note, our fourth tie-breaking factor looks back to our discussion of
Philosophy and Political Theory.162 Many of the arguments supporting anti-commodification
norms contain value judgments. The norms against commodification were thought to perform
important functions such as preventing the wealthy from purchasing power within non-market
spheres, protecting goods and relationships with inherent dignity from being corrupted by market
language and logic, and insuring that these goods and relationships are treated with the respect
they deserve. When it is normatively inappropriate for the parties to discuss a promise using
cost-benefit language, do we really want a judge or jury to assign damages for breech?
Calculating damages requires cost-benefit thinking; the promise must generally be assigned a
dollar value.163 This is the essence of commodification. Anti-commodification norms might
warn against legal enforcement just as they prevent the parties from explicit bargaining.
Finally, we note that parties can always transgress anti-commodification norms and
invoke the consideration doctrine if they place sufficient value on having their promises
enforced. Even parties operating within thick relationships sometimes hire lawyers. We do not
claim any certainty about the nature or scope of anti-commodification norms. In many contexts,
promises may be characterized by mixed motives. The parties may care about both the substance
of the transaction and the message sent by the transaction. By requiring only nominal
consideration, our preferred version of the consideration doctrine would provide a legally
binding option for all parties who sufficiently care about the substance of their transaction to
ignore any norms against voicing consideration. When the parties already trust one another, for
instance, they may find it easy to invoke consideration. But when the parties are engaged in a
delicate courtship dance with high potential for misunderstandings, they may decide that the
potential gains from making a promise binding do not justify the risk of violating anticommodification norms.
In a sense, we force the parties to trade off between concerns over inappropriate signaling
and the inability to secure their promises through law, rather than requiring courts to make these
judgments. If the parties place sufficient value on making a promise enforceable, they can
always declare that the promise is being exchanged for a penny, even if doing so is socially
awkward or risks sending an undesired message. As such, when anti-commodification norms
deter parties from invoking even nominal consideration, we can expect that the parties were not
overly concerned about being unable to secure their promise through law.
Our tie-breaking factors are speculative and under-theorized. We cannot fully develop
these arguments within the space constraints of this article. Nevertheless, we believe the factors
combine to justify a default rule against enforcing non-commodifiable promises. When
161

We express deep discomfort about these speculations into promises’ social worth. Again, we only resort to these
substantivist arguments as a tie-breaker; we would instead look to the parties’ desires if we could confidently
ascertain their desires. However, it is worth noting that our substantivist tie-breaker argument draws a different line
than the substantivist arguments we discussed in Part I.B. We continue to believe that gratuitous promises as a class
are no less valuable than exchange promises. Altruistic promises should generally be welfare enhancing. We
suggest only that non-commodifiable gratuitous promises – promises made for signaling purposes such as trust or
status – might lack socially value.
162
Part II.B.
163
We might avoid calculating damages by only providing the remedy of specific performance. But this would
require a significant adjustment to our law of contract remedies.
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signaling spirals make it impossible to determine the parties’ true desires, the tie-breaking
arguments provide cause for denying the option to have promises enforced.
V. CONCLUSION
Substantive theorists have sought to deny legal support for gratuitous promises; formalist
scholars have been unable to justify the use of consideration in place of alternative forms. Our
account takes a different approach, arguing that requiring nominal consideration leads to
enforcing promises when parties actually wish to be bound. We base our account on the roles of
anti-commodification norms and of inefficient signaling. What previous scholars have failed to
realize is that even nominal consideration is unavailable within certain social contexts. When
parties are unable to articulate consideration, they will generally also be unable to make return
payments and scope adjustments, creating the potential for inefficient signaling spirals that can
harm both promisors and promisees.
The consideration form can thus serve to identify contexts in which parties are fully able
to bargain over the content of their promises. What ultimately matters is not whether the parties
do offer consideration, but rather whether they can offer consideration. The key question is
whether social norms permit bargaining over the terms of a promise. As such, the use of
consideration language informs courts that providing a legally binding option will benefit the
contracting parties. By voicing consideration, the parties demonstrate that their expressed
intentions correspond with their underlying desires—that their promise is of a type for which
parties should generally desire an option for legal enforcement.
Our account provides a framework for clearing up the morass of existing doctrine. Many
of the conflicting precedents that currently plague the case law have arisen from courts’ attempts
to determine which promises are socially valuable.164 These inquiries are misguided. When the
consideration doctrine is interpreted to allow nominal consideration, parties can make this
determination instead of the courts. Whenever the parties care sufficiently about having their
promises supported by law—valuing the substance of their transaction over any messages it
might send—the parties can invoke consideration. A nominal consideration requirement only
denies enforcement when promises are made within ritualized social contexts in which norms
block the use of even nominal consideration—contexts in which inefficient signaling combines
with tie-breaking factors so that parties would generally prefer to leave their promises nonbinding.
The consideration doctrine is not the only mechanism used for making promises legally
binding. In addition to consideration, courts sometimes consider other doctrines like reliance.
Our paper seeks only to justify the consideration doctrine, not to provide a complete account of
all potential rules for contract formation. Indeed, our account provides strong support for
enforcing promises backed by nominal consideration, but it does not necessarily mean that
promises lacking consideration should not be enforced. The law might well benefit from using
other doctrines like reliance to supplement the consideration doctrine, providing additional
methods by which promises might be enforced.
Although our account does not completely address potential supplements to the
consideration doctrine, our discussion provides a framework through which these supplementary
approaches should be analyzed. For instance, some states enforce promises using a seal doctrine
164

See supra Part I.C.
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even when consideration is lacking. By signing written statements of their promises in the
presence of a notary public, promisors in these states can make even unilateral promises legally
binding. To determine the merits of this supplemental rule, future papers must look to both
inefficient signaling and to anti-commodification norms. We have assumed for the purposes of
our argument that alternatives to nominal consideration like a seal or writing requirement are
less-sensitive to anti-commodification norms, but this might not be the case. Certainly, anticommodification norms block more than just the use of bargaining. There might be
circumstances in which bargaining is socially appropriate, but where going to a notary public
would violate taboos.
We have argued that a nominal consideration requirement effectively divides the
circumstances in which inefficient signaling presents a serious problem from circumstances in
which this problem does not occur. We believe that nominal consideration performs this role far
better than any alternative forms. Although nominal consideration is not the only formalism
entangled with anti-commodification norms, no other formalism equally signifies whether parties
are able to negotiate over more than two terms. After all, the existence of consideration
(otherwise known as return payments) is one of the additional terms we analyze in Part IV. And
the other term—scope adjustments—will be permissible within the same general set of social
scenarios as nominal consideration. Although we are open to the use of alternative doctrines as a
supplement to our nominal consideration rule, we remain confident that nominal consideration
should be the primary mechanism through which promises are made legally binding.
We believe that anti-commodification norms have significant implications for contract
formation. We hope to see further work analyzing the implications of these norms. As a tiebreaking argument, we note that it may be undesirable for courts to entangle themselves with
non-commodifiable promises. Yet this argument might stand on its own, justifying the
consideration doctrine even apart from our game theory and welfare analysis.165 How courts
should react to anti-commodification norms is an under-theorized question that merits further
inquiry. And future empirical studies might demonstrate that certain sets of promises are not
subject to inefficient signaling spirals and should thus be enforceable even without nominal
consideration.166
This paper has been dedicated to proving a single point: that courts should enforce
promises backed only by nominal consideration. Despite the many questions our account leaves
unanswered, on this point we are certain. Courts should not create special rules to deny legal
support for inter-familial promises and the like. To the extent that the relationship-oriented
165

To fully develop this argument would require a much deeper engagement with the commodification literature
than we offer here. Where we avoid taking sides in the commodification debate and limit ourselves to drawing
general conclusions from the literature, developing an argument of this sort would require evaluating conflicting
theories about the nature of the anti-commodification phenomenon and its normative implications.
166
Yet, even here, our account would provide a framework for analyzing whether exceptions of this sort are valid. It
is not enough to claim that exempted promises are socially valuable, as these inquiries have been made in the past.
This argument only had force against the assumption that other gratuitous promises were valueless, an assumption
we have shown to be mistaken. Even if we prioritize encouraging certain promises – for example: donations to
charities – above any potential harm to promisors, this would not necessarily justify excepting these promises from
the consideration requirement. Inefficient signaling spirals can harm promisees—such as charitable recipients—in
addition to harming promisors. Only if future empirical studies show that inefficient signaling is unlikely for certain
categories of non-commodifiable promises should we exclude these promises from the consideration requirement.
Until studies of this sort can be conducted, we favor a default rule of only enforcing promises backed by at least
nominal consideration. And we continue to doubt whether it would even be possible to conduct studies of this sort.
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nature of these promises presents a problem, anti-commodification norms will deny these parties
the use of nominal consideration without the need for courts to intervene. In place of the various
substantive inquiries made by existing case law, we call for making the existence of nominal
consideration both a necessary and sufficient condition for the use of the consideration doctrine.
Our account provides courts with simpler and more coherent guidelines for applying the
consideration doctrine, and with a superior method for determining which promises parties
actually desire to have enforced.
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APPENDIX A. THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING

This Appendix begins our formal proof for the problem of inefficient signaling, as
discussed in Part III of the paper. Our proof relies on a model developed by Phillippe Aghion
and Benjamin Hermalin.167 Their model shows how limitations on contractual terms can be
welfare enhancing.168 The Aghion-Hermalin model is part of a newer form of game theory based
on asymmetric information.169 This branch of scholarship first developed as part of insurance
economics, but the approach has since been applied to numerous problems in law and
economics.170 Nevertheless, this article is the first time a model of this sort has been used to
analyze the consideration doctrine.171 This Appendix proceeds in two sections: Section A shows
how our question – whether limitations should be placed on promisors’ ability to legally bind
themselves – fits the conditions under which the Aghion-Hermalin model applies. Section B
explains the model’s implications through a series of graphs.
A. Six Conditions under Which the Model Applies
Space constraints prevent us from formally elaborating the Aghion-Hermalin model.172
Fortunately, the authors prove that their results hold whenever six conditions apply.173 The
conditions are as follows: First, there must be “opposite preferences over the contract terms.”174
167

Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 1344, at 381-98.
The authors’ paradigmatic case involves an entrepreneur raising capital for a project. Aghion & Hermalin, id., at
381-98. Their paper shows the possibility of efficiency gains from limitations on the amount the entrepreneur can
be forced to pay in the case of default, essentially justifying bankruptcy laws. Id. at 400-01. The authors also
discuss how their model can be applied to limitations on penalties for breach of contract and to mandated benefits in
employment contracts. In a separate paper, Ian Ayres has used their model to discuss possible inefficiencies in
corporate contracting. Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991).
We draw upon Ayres’s work in seeking to present a simplified description of the Aghion-Hermalin model.
169
Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 387-92. Aghion and Hermalin base their work on an extensive body of
scholarship. In addition to the Rothschild and Stiglitz piece previously mentioned, supra note 84, noteworthy works
include George Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J.
OF ECON. 488 (1970) and A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART. J. OF ECON 629 (1973). In 2001,
Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz jointly won the Nobel Prize for their work on asymmetric information and signaling.
Although our analysis relies on papers by these authors and others, we do not discuss all of our debts. Suffice it to
say that both Aghion and Hermalin’s model and our own extension of that model stand on a mountain of previous
economics scholarship.
170
Ian Ayres describes some of the ways in which this scholarship has been applied to legal problems in Ian Ayres,
Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990).
171
It is mysterious as to why scholars have failed to realize the implications of this scholarship for the consideration
doctrine as at least some scholars interested in applying economic reasoning to contract law are familiar with the
form of analysis. For instance, Eric Posner discusses the Aghion-Hermalin model in his recent essay Economic
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 860 (2003). Nevertheless,
in the very same article, Posner repeats the conventional wisdom that contract law should decide which contracts to
enforce by looking at promisor’s intentions, Id. at 849. He concludes his discussion of the consideration doctrine by
supporting our premise that existing scholarship has failed to justify the doctrine’s refusal to enforce promises where
promisors clearly intended the contract to be enforced. Id. at 850-51. He never mentions the possibility of applying
an Aghion-Hermalin type model to address this puzzle.
172
The model fills twenty-nine pages of an economics journal and relies on a level of mathematical complexity
beyond the ability of most readers of law journals to comprehend.
173
Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 384, 398.
174
Id. at 398.
168
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Second, both promisors and promisees must have “convex preferences over the terms of the
contract.”175 Third, the different types of promisors must systematically differ with regard to the
“marginal rate of substitution between the terms of the contract.”176 Fourth, promisors must have
“private information” that “cannot be contracted on.”177 Fifth, promisors must have “bargaining
power.”178 And sixth, the terms of the contract must lie on a continuous spectrum.179
The first five conditions clearly apply to our question—whether limiting the availability
of a legally binding form can enhance welfare. Only the sixth condition is questionable.
The first condition is easily met; promisors and promisees have opposite preferences for
both contracting terms. Holding the benefit the promisor expects to obtain from promising
constant, promisors prefer to obtain this benefit using the lowest possible values for both the size
of the promise and the level of sanctions, while promisees prefer higher values for these terms.180
As such, promisors have cost and value curves that work in opposite directions. The higher
promisors set the terms the more the promisees benefit, and the more the promisors can receive
in return for making the promise.181 Yet raising the terms increases the costs of making the
promise. Promisors should thus choose the combination of terms that generates the maximum
value at the minimum cost.
Moving to the second condition, the parties should have convex preferences over the
terms of the contract. Convex preferences come from risk aversion. Risk aversion is a standard
assumption in economic models and is thought to originate from the decreasing marginal utility
of money.182 Like most economic actors, promisors and promisees should generally be risk
averse.
The third condition requires that promisors differ in their willingness to trade off between
the two terms. This condition holds because promisors have varying probabilities of
performance. For any fixed level of benefit, reliable promisors should be more willing to
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Id.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id at 384. Aghion & Hermalin assume that their contract terms are continuous following standard economic
practice. As such, they do not discuss this assumption when generalizing their results. Also following standard
economic practice, they assume their terms can be represented by twice-differentiable von Neumann-Morgernstern
utility functions. Id.
180
Promisees prefer higher levels of sanctions first because sanctions make it costly for the promisor to renege and
thus increase the probability of performance and second because—in the case of legal damages—some portion of
the sanctions are paid by the promisor to the promisee.
181
To see why this is the case, we must return to the four types of promises described in Part II.C of the paper. For
all four types of promises, the value the promisors receive from making the promise depends on the benefit
conferred on promisees. In the case of exchange-oriented and trust-building promises, the more promisors offer, the
more promisees should be willing to give in return—whether in the form of a defined exchange or undefined
goodwill. Similarly, large status-enhancing promises generate more status than do small status-enhancing promises.
And altruistic promisors benefit directly from the value conferred on promisees due to interdependent utility. Thus,
regardless of a promisor’s motivation, the benefit a promisor receives from making a promise partially depends on
the size of the promise – the benefit conferred on the promisee.
182
But see MATTHEW RABIN, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Kahneman & Tversky eds., 2000) (arguing that diminishing marginal utility of wealth
cannot explain the levels of risk aversion frequently observed). Instead, Rabin claims risk aversion is a result of
cognitive biases related to the endowment effect.
176
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increase their level of sanctions while reducing the size of their promise than are unreliable
promisors.
The fourth and fifth conditions require that promisors have private information and can
exercise market power. These conditions follow from our assumption of asymmetric
information and our use of the offer-acceptance model, respectively.183
Finally, we assume that the sixth condition holds for the purposes of this Appendix. The
sixth condition demands that both contracting terms fall along a continuous spectrum. In other
words, promisors must be able to gradually increase or decrease both the size of their promises
and the level of sanctions rather than being forced to choose between discrete options.
The size of a promise probably does fall along a continuous spectrum in most cases. A
promisor might increase the magnitude of a promise by pledging to transfer a larger quantity of
goods or services. When the quantity cannot be altered, a promisor might still increase the size
of the promise by delivering the goods or services at an earlier point in time or otherwise making
the promise more desirable to the promisee.
In contrast, we have doubts about whether the level of sanctions falls along a continuous
spectrum. In many cases, promisors may be stuck with the discrete choice between offering
either a set level of sanctions corresponding with social stigma or else a set level of sanctions
resulting from legal damages. Nevertheless, we assume that the level of sanctions falls on a
continuous spectrum for the purposes of this Appendix.184 For balance, we adopt the opposite
assumption when creating our own model in Appendix B.
Although we assume that the level of sanctions falls on a continuous spectrum, there is
still a limit to the maximum level of sanctions. This limit can either be set by the promisor’s
wealth—promisors cannot pay more in damages than they own—or else by law. Where the
consideration doctrine prevents parties from making their promises binding, such as for many
gratuitous promises, the maximum level of sanctions corresponds with the highest possible
amount of social stigma. Where the consideration doctrine allows parties to secure their
promises through law, such as for most exchanges and for when courts enforce gratuitous
promises backed by only nominal consideration, the maximum level of sanctions corresponds
with the highest possible amount of legal damages. The level of sanctions is still continuous, as
a promisor can set the sanctions at any level up to the maximum limit. But there exists a
maximum level of sanctions which can be altered by changing the law.185
Consequently, all six assumptions can be said to hold for the question of whether
allowing a legally binding option might reduce welfare. As such, the Aghion-Hermalin model
can be used to analyze the consideration doctrine.
183

There are circumstances under which a promisee can have market power rather than the promisor—such as if the
promisor is a supplier to a monopsonist buyer. But as a general rule, promisors should have market power as long as
they design their promises as in the offer-acceptance model.
184
This assumption is not entirely implausible. The potential for stigma might be increased by pledging publicly or
by invoking a religious or culturally significant symbol to secure the promise. For instance, swearing to God or on a
Bible might have more serious social consequences than a promise unbacked by any religious symbolism And
where the law permits the use of liquidated damages clauses, parties can set the amount of legal sanctions at any
level they like. Still, there are natural limits to the level of stigma related damages and liquidated damages clauses
are often unavailable due to either legal or practical limitations. See infra note 195, for further discussion.
185
Allowing an option for legal enforcement increases the maximum level of sanctions above stigma levels. For
enforceable promises, allowing liquidated damages clauses can increase the maximum level of sanctions. Striking
down unreasonably high liquidated damages clauses limits the maximum level of legal sanctions.
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B. Explaining the Model’s Implications
Since all six conditions can be said to apply, Aghion and Hermalin’s conclusions hold for
our question. Limiting the availability of a legally binding form can increase welfare; the mere
fact that parties choose to employ a legally binding option does not indicate that they benefit
from the existence of that option. The logic behind this conclusion is best demonstrated through
a series of graphs. Readers desiring more formal substantiation of these results should refer to
Aghion and Hermalin’s article.186
Figure 2. Cost Curves
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Figure 3. Value Curves
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Figure 2 shows how promisors value the tradeoffs between the costs associated with the
size of a promise and the level of sanctions. CR depicts the cost tradeoff curve of a reliable
promisor. CU shows the cost tradeoff curve of a promisor with a lower probability of
performance—an “unreliable” promisor. As the reliable promisor knows that she is less likely to
default, she will be more willing to accept a high level of sanctions than will the unreliable
promisor. Locations on the southwest portion of the graph correspond with lower costs for
promisors than do locations to the northeast.
Figure 3 shows the combinations of the two terms capable of producing the same level of
value for the promisors, in other words, the promisors’ indifference curves or value curves.
Since the value received by promisors is related to the benefit conferred on promisees, and since
promisees prefer larger-sized promises and higher levels of sanctions, the level of value increases
toward the northeast corner of the graph.
The value a promisor receives from making a promise also depends on her perceived
reliability. Value curve VR depicts the mix of terms a promisor can offer in exchange for a
specified level of value if she is viewed as a reliable type. Value curve VU shows the mix of
terms required to produce the same level of value if the promisor is perceived as an unreliable
type. Promisors perceived as unreliable need to offer a higher mixture of the two terms in order
to derive the same value as promisors perceived as reliable types; hence, curve VU lies to the
northeast of curve VR.187 Whether a promisor needs to offer the terms described by VR or VU
186

Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134.
Promisors perceived as unreliable also need to include a relatively higher level of sanctions in order to make their
promises seem credible. As such, the value curve of the unreliable type promisor is more steeply sloped than the
value curve of the reliable type promisor.
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depends on the promisor’s perceived reliability, not her actual reliability.188 VP shows the pooled
value curve—the set of combinations of the two terms capable of producing the given level of
value when it is impossible to tell whether the promisor is a reliable or unreliable type.189
Figure 4 combines the cost and value curves to show a possible equilibrium for the terms
chosen by the two promisors. Point A represents the spot along the pooled value curve where the
reliable-type promisor can derive the specified level of value with the minimal cost. Without any
ability to distinguish herself from unreliable promisors, a reliable promisor would select point A.
Since unreliable promisors wish to be seen as reliable, they would also pick point A in order to
avoid signaling their greater probability of default.
However, reliable promisors face incentives to signal their greater reliability through their
choice of terms. For instance, reliable promisors might try to offer point C in order to
differentiate their promises from those of the unreliable promisors. If a reliable promisor could
successfully communicate her type, offering point C would allow her to achieve the same value
previously gained by point A, but at a lower cost. In contrast, since the unreliable promisors
have a steeper cost curve, offering point C would raise their costs as compared to point A. Thus,
we might think that that choosing point C would demonstrate that a promisor is of the reliable
type.
Yet, once the reliable promisors offer point C, unreliable promisors will no longer have
the option of promising point A. Choosing anything other than point C would reveal that a
promisor is unreliable. Instead, unreliable promisors must either follow the reliable promisors in
offering point C or else offer point B—the minimum cost for achieving the specified level of
value along the unreliable promisor value curve. Point B corresponds to the cost curve CU*.
Since point C lies to the southwest of CU*, the unreliable promisors will follow the reliable ones
in offering point C.
Once the unreliable promisors begin offering point C, the reliable promisors can no
longer achieve the specified level of value by picking a point on the curve VR. Instead, they
must select a point along the pooled value curve VP. Moreover, the reliable promisors no longer
have point A available as an option. Any promisor who picks point A—regardless of their actual
reliability—will be perceived as unreliable and will thus be unable to achieve the level of value
associated with the pooled value line VP. The only options available are locations to the right of
point C along the pooled value line VP, or else points along the unreliable promisor value line
VU. The reliable promisors thus face incentives to continue increasing their level of sanctions in
order to signal their difference from the unreliable promisors. The unreliable promisors will
continue following the reliable ones by also raising the level of sanctions they offer. This
process continues until both types of promisors reach the maximum level of sanctions.
Consequently, both types of promisors end up offering point D, where the maximum level of
sanctions intersects the pooled value curve VP.
The pooled equilibrium at point D is not an efficient outcome. Both reliable and
unreliable promisors would face lower costs and achieve the same benefit by offering promises
at point A. Assuming the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by promisees, the
188

Again, the amount promisees offer in exchange for a promise depends on the promisor’s perceived reliability, not
actual reliability.
189
The slope of the pooled indifference curve must lie somewhere between the slope of the indifference curves for
the reliable and unreliable type promisors. The exact placement of the pooled curve depends on the relative
numbers of reliable and unreliable type promisors in the overall population.
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promisees should be indifferent between receiving promises at point A or point D. As such,
moving to point A would represent a Pareto improvement over the pooled equilibrium at point D.
Both types of promisors would be better off if the promises were made at point A, while the
promisees would not be harmed.

Figure 4. Pooled Equilibrium
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A pooled equilibrium is not the only possible outcome for the signaling game. Figure 5
shows how the game can generate a separating equilibrium. The slopes of the cost curves have
been adjusted from those in Figure 3 in order to produce the new outcome. In Figure 5, the
reliable promisors can offer point E and thus signal their greater probability of performance.
Point E lies just to the right of the unreliable promisor cost curve CU, so the unreliable promisors
will prefer to offer point B along their own value curve rather than following the reliable
promisors in offering point E. Having signaled their difference from the unreliable promisors,
the reliable promisors are able to offer point E along the reliable promisor value line instead of
being forced to use the pooled value line.
Like the pooled equilibrium in Figure 4, the separating equilibrium depicted in Figure 5
is not an efficient outcome. Both reliable and unreliable promisors would face lower costs by
offering promises at point A as opposed to their respective outcomes at points E and B.
Assuming the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by promisees, the promisees as a
group should be indifferent between receiving promises at point A from both types of promisors
or receiving promises from the reliable promisors at point E and from the unreliable ones at point
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B. As such, a pooled equilibrium at point A would represent a near Pareto improvement over the
separating equilibrium at points B and E.190
Why then don’t the reliable promisors just stick with offering promises at point A rather
than moving to point E? Because the reliable promisors do not actually have the choice between
offering promises at point A or at point E. From a starting place of point A, reliable promisors
face incentives to instead offer point C. Once the unreliable promisors follow the reliable types
in offering point C, point A is no longer available. Any promise made at point A would be seen
as coming from an unreliable promisor. Continuing their attempts to signal their greater
reliability, reliable promisors will offer promises further to the right along the reliable promisor
value curve VR. Unreliable promisors will follow these signals until the reliable promisors end
up offering point E, at which time it becomes preferable for the unreliable promisors to offer
point B along their own value curve. Any reliable promisors who sought to depart from the new
equilibrium outcome by offering a promise to the left of point E would be viewed as unreliable
and would thus need to offer a promise along the unreliable promisor value curve. Once again,
the signaling process ends up harming both types of promisors.

Figure 5. Separating Equilibrium
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The pooled outcome represents only a near pareto improvement rather than an actual pareto improvement
because it has different distributional implications for individual promisees within the larger group.
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These inefficient outcomes can be prevented by setting the maximum sanctions at the
appropriate level.191 Figure 6 shows how the promisors from Figure 5 could benefit by a
reduction in the maximum level of legal sanctions.192 With the maximum allowable sanctions
set so as to intersect point A, reliable promisors will be unable to signal by increasing their
choice of sanctions above the level of point A. Consequently, both reliable and unreliable
promisors will promise at Point A, thus improving the welfare of both types of promisors.

Figure 6. Optimal Sanctions
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Pooled equilibriums like those depicted in Figure 3 can always be made more efficient by setting the maximum
level of sanctions at an appropriate level. This result comes partially from the fact that pooled equilibrium can only
result from a maximum level of sanctions. Were sanctions unlimited—either by the law or by promisors’ wealth—a
separating equilibrium would always result.
However, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium that cannot be made more efficient by
imposing a maximum level of legal sanctions. See Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 397.
192
It is easy to see how the same result can be reached for the promisors in the pooled equilibrium from Figure 3.
The separating equilibrium in Figure 4 can be transformed into a pooled equilibrium by shifting the level of
maximum sanctions to the left of where curve CU intersects curve VR. This would cause both types of promisors to
promise where the new maximum sanctions line intersected curve VR. Since this result is less efficient than pooling
at point A, further reducing the level of maximum sanctions would thus benefit both types of promisors.
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The Aghion-Hermalin model shows how a limit on the maximum level of legal sanctions
can enhance welfare. By limiting the sanctions that a promisor can offer in the event of breach,
the law can prevent inefficient signaling. As Aghion and Hermalin summarize their findings:
Parties to a contract may enter into inefficient contracts because of asymmetric information.
Under asymmetric information, a contract plays two roles. First, it sets the terms of trade,
and, second, it can reveal private information. As it is the first role that determines the
efficiency of a contract, the second role can lead to inefficiency. Restrictions on contracts can
increase efficiency if they limit the signaling role without affecting the terms of trade role.193

However, just because a limit on sanctions can improve welfare does not mean that it
does improve welfare. Without knowing the slopes of promisor cost and value curves, we
cannot know the appropriate setting for the maximum level of legal sanctions. The consideration
doctrine might reduce sanctions to an inefficiently low level.
Figure 7. Inefficiently Low Sanctions
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Figure 7 shows the consequences of setting the maximum level of legal sanctions too
low. Instead of creating a pooled equilibrium at point A, promisors are limited to the level of
sanctions associated with point F. Hence, point F represents the new pooled equilibrium
outcome. Since point F lies to the northeast of the cost curves both promisors would have faced
193

Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 403.
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had they been able to offer point A, point F is an inefficient outcome. Allowing promisors to
offer point A would create a Pareto improvement—enhancing the welfare of both types of
promisors without harming promisees.
The maximum level of legal sanctions can be set too high or too low. Either result
diminishes welfare. The question, then, is how to set sanctions at the appropriate level. Are
parties made better off when they can back their promises by legal damages or would welfare be
enhanced by limiting them to the damages corresponding with social stigma? As noted in Part
III, our formal models cannot answer this question.194 But the Aghion-Hermalin model can—
and does—disprove the current paradigm of assuming that parties who utilize a legally binding
option necessarily benefit from the existence of that option.

194

See supra note 142, and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B. AN EXTENSION OF THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL

This Appendix concludes our formal proof for the problem of inefficient signaling, as
discussed in Part III of the paper and in Appendix A. The Aghion-Hermalin Model described in
Appendix A proves that the mere fact that parties employ a legally binding form should not be
taken as evidence that the parties desire the continuation of that form. Parties may be made
better off when denied the option to back their promises with legal damages. Nevertheless, the
Aghion-Hermalin Model tells our story imperfectly. Since the model uses only two types of
promisors, it cannot fully demonstrate how a legally binding form can create a negative spiral
harming larger groups of promisors and promisees. Crucially, the model does not provide any
means for showing how the imposition of a legally binding option affects promisees. Moreover,
the model’s assumption that damages fall on a continuous scale departs from our intuitions about
promises and contracts. Parties may often have only two options for damages—either a fixed
amount of stigma if the promise is not legally binding, or else a set level of legal damages if the
promise is backed by law.195
Consequently, we have extended Aghion and Hermalin’s work to develop our own
model. Our model uses four types of promisors and allows only two options for remedies—
either stigma-related penalties or full expectation damages. We have kept our model
significantly less formal than Aghion and Hermalin’s in order to fit its analysis within the space
constraints of this article. Nevertheless, our model does rest on a few simple equations.
To begin elaborating our model, we need to define a few terms. Let X measure the size
of a promise. And let Pi measure a promisor’s probability of breach (for promisors i equals one
through four). We use Pavg to indicate the average probability of breach for all promisors who do
not employ the legally binding form, assuming an equal percentage of each type of promisor
within the overall population. Hence, Pavg also refers to the perceived likelihood of breach for
promisors not using the legally enforceable option.196
Using the constant R as a placeholder coefficient, we express the benefit promisors
receive from making a promise as: (1-Pavg)RX. Looking back to our discussions of the benefit
promisors receive from promising, recall that promisor benefit increases with the size of the
promise (X),197 but is discounted by the promisor’s perceived reliability (1-Pavg).198

195

In theory, promisors can use liquidated damages clauses to set legal sanctions at any level they like. Yet practical
considerations often prevent the use of liquidated damages clauses. Current doctrine places limits on the use of
these clauses, frequently ignoring the clauses in favor of expectation damages. Even when the courts do enforce
these clauses, contracting parties may find it difficult to agree upon a specified amount of damages at contract
formation. Consequently, parties often have only a single choice for the level of legal damages. Similarly, parties
often have little control over the damages of social stigma. Parties may sometimes be able to alter stigma-related
damages by making their promises more or less publicly, but it is hard to negotiate publicity. Regardless of what the
parties agree on, promisees face incentives to later publicize the promise in order to deter breach. Hence, parties
may often have only two options for damages – either a set level of legal damages or a set level of stigma damages.
When legal enforcement is not available, parties may not have any choice regarding the level of sanctions, with the
set level of stigma damages being their only option.
196
The reason follows from our specification that perceived reliability comes from the average reliability of all
promisors with similar observable characteristics. Any promisors with distinctive observable characteristics would
be excluded from our pool.
197
See note 179, supra, and accompanying text.
198
See notes 139-141, supra, and accompanying text.
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Of course, there are costs to fulfilling a promise. These costs are discounted by the
promisor’s actual probability of performance, rather than perceived probability of performance,
since the costs are only incurred if the promise is fulfilled. The costs of completing a promise
can thus be expressed as: (1-Pi)XE. The E exponent is used so that costs increase faster than
benefits. Without the use of an exponent, either all promises would be infinitely sized or else no
promises would be made. The use of an exponent also captures the intuition that there are
increasing marginal costs to making promises larger in size.
Finally, promisors also face stigma-related costs in the event of breach. Using the
constant S as a coefficient for the impact of stigma, these costs can be expressed as: (Pi)SX.
Combining the terms, we can calculate the total welfare a promisor expects to receive
from making a non-legally binding promise as:199
(A) Promisor Welfare (not bound) = (1-Pavg)RX – (1-Pi)XE – (Pi)SX
Through the use of a legally binding form, a promisor can essentially reduce both her
perceived probability of breach (Pavg) and actual probability of breach (Pi) to zero, insofar as they
affect the first two terms.200 As such, the welfare promisors derive from making binding
promises can be expressed as:201
(B) Promisor Welfare (bound) = RX – XE – (Pi)(S+D)X
The first two terms come directly from equation A above. The simplification results
from setting both Pi and Pavg to zero. The final term comes from adding the costs of legal
damages—D—to the costs associated with stigma in the case where the promisor is unable to
perform. Despite being bound, circumstances may prevent the promisor from fulfilling the
promise in the manner originally intended.202 The constant D captures any additional costs—
beyond stigma—that legal sanctions impose on the promisor over the costs that would have been
incurred were she able to perform.203
In order to calculate the welfare received by promisees, we need to introduce the
placeholder constants H, L, and V. V acts as a coefficient on the value promisees receive from a
fulfilled promise. H relates to the harm promisees suffer from relying on a non-legally binding
promise that is breached. For promises that are legally binding, L measures the legal costs
199

The first term corresponds with the promisor’s value curves—Figure 2 in Appendix A. The second and third
terms combine to form the promisor’s cost curves—Figure 3 in Appendix A.
200
The remedy of expectation damages means that even in the event of breach the promisor must still confer a
benefit to the promisee equivalent to that originally promised. Hence, Pi and Pavg become zero for the first two
terms. Any difference between the costs incurred in paying these damages and the actual costs of performance is
measured by the constant D. Pi does not become zero in the third term, as promisors are only subject to stigma and
legal damages in the case of breach.
201
Although we label the equations as referring to actual welfare for simplicity and brevity, all four equations
actually refer to expected welfare.
202
While impossibility can sometimes be used as a defense excusing non-performance, it is easy to imagine
circumstances that fall short of impossibility but that would still cause a sincere promisor to breach.
203
D can be negative if the cost of legal sanctions is less than the originally anticipated cost of performance or if
stigma is less burdensome in the legally binding scenario than in the unbound scenario. D essentially acts as a
composite term for any differences in the costs associated with breach when a promisor is legally bound than when
the promisor is not bound.
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associated with forcing the promisor to pay damages.204 As such, we can express the welfare
promisees receive from non-binding and binding promises, respectively, as:
(C) Promisee Welfare (not bound) = (1-Pi)VX – Pi(HX)
(D) Promisee Welfare (bound) = VX – Pi(LX)
Using these equations, we can model the welfare consequences of introducing a legally
binding form. Whether allowing the option for legal enforcement enhances or diminishes overall
welfare depends on the settings for the constants and on the promisors’ probabilities of breach.
Just as the results of the Aghion-Hermalin model depend on the slopes for the promisors’ cost
and value curves, the results of our model depend on the settings for the terms used to calculate
the parties’ costs and values.
Figure 8 shows the model’s results when Pi=(5%, 10%, 15%, 20%), E=2, V=15, H=2,
L=5, C=2, S=20, and D=24. X is set at 10 in the absence of a legally binding option, and is
derived from the above equations when promises can be made legally binding.205 R is derived
and then used as a constant.206
The first column in Figure 8 shows the welfare received by each promisor and promisee
in the absence of a legally binding option. The numbers in the parentheses next to the values for
promisor welfare depict the welfare each promisor would receive were she to employ a legally
binding form. Hence, once such a form is introduced, promisor one should choose to bind
herself because doing so increases her welfare from 95 to 107. None of the other promisors
immediately bind themselves, as doing so would reduce their welfare.
Yet after promisor one chooses to bind herself, she is no longer included in the pool used
to calculate Pavg. The second column shows the welfare promisors two through four—and their
respective promisees—would receive from making non-legally binding promises subject to the
higher value for Pavg. Even though promisor two received more welfare from making a nonbinding promise while promisor one remained part of the pool (with a potential welfare of 90 for
a non-binding promise and 85 for a binding promise), with promisor one removed from the pool,
promisor two can gain more welfare from exercising the legally binding option (with a potential
welfare of 84 for the non-binding promise and 85 for the binding promise). Hence, promisor two
follows promisor one in utilizing the legally binding form, and Pavg increases yet again as we
move to the final column.

204

L also includes any other differences between the value that the promisee receives from legal sanctions and the
value the promisee would receive had the promisor performed faithfully. As with D, L is a composite term and can
be negative.
205
Although the promisors initially make promises of the same size, they may alter the size of their promises when
faced with the costs associated with making their promises legally binding. Unlike in the Aghion-Hermalin model,
signaling is not an issue once promisors enter the legally binding form. The only signal that can be sent is to use the
form.
The level for X is calculated by taking the derivative of the equation for promisor value with respect to X,
setting the derivative equal to zero, and then solving for X. This method calculates the setting for X which produces
the maximum benefit for promisors—the setting that would be chosen by an economically rational promisor.
206
R equals approximately 23 in the calculations behind both Figure 7 and Figure 8. The level of R is calculated so
that X remains the same across all four promisors in the unbound scenario.
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Promisors three and four still gain more welfare from abstaining from the legally binding
form, making column three our final outcome. Both the overall group of promisors and the
overall group of promisees lose welfare from the introduction of the legally binding option.
Total promisor welfare drops from 350 to 335 and total promisee welfare drops from 515 to 510
as we move from column one to column three.207 Although promisor one and her associated
promisee benefit from the legally binding option, their gains are overwhelmed by the losses
suffered by the other promisors and promisees.208 Overall welfare is maximized by not allowing
promisors the option of securing their promises through law.

Figure 8: D=24
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Figure 9: D=10
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Figure 9 shows how a legally binding form can enhance welfare with the constants
specified differently. The only difference between the calculations underlying Figures 8 and 9 is
that D is set at twenty-four in Figure 8 and at ten in Figure 9. Consequently, the promisors in
207

Although promisees benefit from being paid legal damages, this benefit is overwhelmed by the losses they suffer
as promisors decrease the size of their promises in response to the cost of possibly needing to pay the damages. If
promisors refrained from promising all together, rather than just decreasing the size of their promises, these losses
might be even more severe.
208
Promisee two also gains, even though promisor two does not.
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Figure 9 suffer relatively smaller losses from the need to pay legal sanctions in the case of breach
as compared to the promisors in Figure 8. This reduced value for D is sufficient to alter the
results so that the introduction of a legally binding option enhances welfare.
All four promisors choose to bind themselves in Figure 9. First, promisors one and two
bind themselves, moving us to column two. Even though promisor three faced incentives to
refrain from using the legally binding form while promisors one and two remained part of the
pool, the reduced value for Pavg in column two leads promisor three to bind herself as well. With
all of the other promisors bound in column three, promisor four also binds herself to generate the
outcome in the last column. Despite the fact that promisors three and four lose welfare from the
introduction of the legally binding form, the overall group of promisors increases its welfare
from 350 to 368 and the overall group of promisees increases its welfare from 515 to 550. In
contrast to Figure 8, allowing a legally binding option enhances welfare.
Of course, these figures depict only two possible settings for the constants. By adjusting
the constants, we can create numerous alternative scenarios. Some scenarios will show that the
introduction of a legally binding form enhances welfare, while other scenarios will show welfare
losses coming from allowing the form. The question remains whether parties are better off when
they can back their promises with legal damages or when they are limited to the damages created
by social stigma. As stated in Part III of the paper, our formal models cannot answer this
question.209 We lack the information needed to determine reasonable values for the constants;
and slight adjustments to the constants can switch the results over a wide range of possible
settings.210 As with Aghion and Hermalin’s work in Appendix A, our model can only disprove
the dominant wisdom that parties who take advantage of a legally binding option necessarily
desire the existence of that option.

209

See supra note 142, and accompanying text.
We encourage readers to play with the model’s specifications in order to demonstrate this fact for themselves.
We will happily send an excel spreadsheet which can be used to calculate the model’s results for different settings of
the constants to any reader who requests it.
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